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AUTOPSY REPORTS AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: A 
PRESUMPTION OF ADMISSIBILITY 
 
Daniel J. Capra

 and Joseph Tartakovsky

 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Courts nationwide are divided over whether autopsy 
reports are “testimonial” under the Sixth Amendment’s 
Confrontation Clause. Resolving that split will affect 
medical examiners as dramatically as Miranda did police. 
This article applies the latest Supreme Court jurisprudence 
to the work of modern medical examiners in a 
comprehensive inquiry.  It argues that autopsy reports 
should be presumed non-testimonial—a presumption 
overcome only by a showing that law enforcement 
involvement materially influenced the examiner’s autopsy 
report. 
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INTRODUCTION: UNDER DEBATE  
IN COURTS NATIONWIDE 
 
n 2004, the Supreme Court, in Crawford v. Washington, restored the 
“original meaning” of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.1 
The framers of that clause—which guarantees a criminal defendant the 
right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him”—meant to outlaw 
the old-world practice of condemning men through ghost accusers who 
couldn’t be cross-examined at trial.2 We get a vivid sense of the 
inquisitorial terror that doomed Sir Walter Raleigh in the political 
persecutions that persist in the lands of unliberty. In summer 2013, 
Russian oppositionist Aleksei Navalny was sentenced to five years’ 
imprisonment, largely on the testimony of a man named Opalev. “[D]uring 
the trial,” the New York Times reported, Opalev “gave contradictory 
evidence, and defense lawyers were not allowed to cross-examine him.”3 
Crawford firmed up the right in favor of criminal defendants but, 
as with most major constitutional decisions, it raised as many questions as 
it answered.
4
 One of the most important is whether the Confrontation 
                                                          
1
 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004). 
2
 Id. at 50 (“[T]he principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was 
the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte 
examinations as evidence against the accused”); id. at 56 (“Involvement of government 
officers in the production of testimony with an eye toward trial presents unique potential 
for prosecutorial abuse—a fact borne out time and again throughout a history with which 
the Framers were keenly familiar.”). 
3
 David M. Herszenhorn, Russian Court Convicts Opposition Leader, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 18, 2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/world/europe /russian-
court-convicts-opposition-leader-aleksei-navalny.html?pagewanted=print. 
4
 Specifically, Crawford replaced the sometimes flimsy test of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 
U.S. 56, 66 (1980), which held that the Confrontation Clause allowed admission of any 
out-of-court statement that fell within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or that 
possessed “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” 
I 
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Clause applies with full rigor to autopsy reports offered for their truth.
5
 
There are two views. On one side is the argument that autopsy reports are 
prepared by neutral pathologists—highly trained specialists who are 
effectively separate from law enforcement, working under a statutory duty 
to determine the cause of unusual deaths.
6
 Their reports can appear in 
prosecutions, but the vast majority do not. To require these impartial 
M.D.s to testify imposes a massive, pointless burden on them and serves 
to bar or undermine just prosecutions because autopsy evidence is soon 
lost and often impossible to recreate. 
On the other side is the argument that autopsy reports are a formal 
record, created sometimes at police behest, by state agents who practically 
function as an arm of law enforcement. Autopsies, far from being a 
reading on some machine, are the product of human skill and judgment. 
The defendant, as with any other formalized testimony, should be able to 
test for fraud or incompetence. Pathologists are “witnesses” against the 
accused. 
 The issue here usually arises when an autopsy report is offered in 
evidence or testified to by a colleague who was not its author.
7
 If the 
                                                          
5
 See, e.g., Euceda v. United States, 66 A.3d 994, 1012-13 (D.C. 2013) (observing 
that courts “continue to be split on this question”); People v. Lewis, 806 N.W.2d 295 
(Mich. 2011) (“[W]hether admission of the contents of an autopsy report through 
testimony of a medical examiner who did not prepare the report constitutes inadmissible 
testimonial hearsay . . . is a jurisprudentially significant question that has divided courts 
across the country.”). The Supreme Court has declined to grant cert petitions raising this 
question. E.g., Craig v. Ohio, 549 U.S. 1255 (2007) (denying certiorari where question 
presented was: “Is an autopsy report used in a murder prosecution a testimonial statement 
within the meaning of Crawford”); see Pet. for Writ of Cert., Craig v. Ohio, 127 S. Ct. 
1374 (Dec. 19, 2006) (No. 06-8490). 
6
 We refer to “autopsies” or “examinations” interchangeably and mean for the 
discussion to apply to autopsies, external examinations, and medical file reviews alike. 
We refer variously to “pathologists,” “doctors,” and “medical examiners” with the same 
people in mind. 
7
 See, e.g., State v. Kennedy, 735 S.E.2d 905, 917 (W. Va. 2012) (allowing a Dr. 
Sabet to give testimony based on autopsy report prepared by Dr. Livingston); State v. 
Craig, 853 N.E.2d 621, 637 (Ohio 2006) (allowing Dr. Lisa Kohler, Summit County 
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report is “testimonial,” it cannot be admitted into evidence unless the 
author testifies (or did so previously, under cross-examination). 
Depending on how you read recent Supreme Court cases, a different 
testifying expert may not even be able to rely on that report.
8
 If the 
examiner dies or retires or moves away, the answer to this question often 
determines whether the case goes on. We think autopsy reports can be 
non-testimonial—and often are. As the studios say, it’s an issue coming 
soon to a supreme court near you. 
  
I. THE STATE OF CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
JURISPRUDENCE 
A. CRAWFORD (2004) 
 
 Crawford is what is usually referred to as a “landmark” decision. 
That term once referred to a conspicuous object that guided wayfarers and 
ships at sea. For the intrepid adventurers at the bar, however, the more 
prominent theme since Crawford has been misdirection and confusion.
9
 
Justice Scalia wrote Crawford but a few years later pronounced 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence “in a shambles.”10 Or as the California 
                                                                                                                                                
medical examiner, to testify using autopsy report of Dr. Roberto Ruiz); State v. Lackey, 
120 P.3d 332, 341 (Kan. 2005) (allowing Dr. Mitchell to testify using Dr. Eckert’s 
report); People v. Dungo, 286 P.3d 442, 445 (N.M. 2012) (allowing Dr. Lawrence’s to 
testify using Dr. Bolduc’s autopsy report). 
8
 See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2228 (2012), discussed below in II.C. 
9
 See, e.g., State v. Navarette, 294 P.3d 435, 437 (N.M. 2013) (“What constitutes a 
testimonial statement is not easily discernable from a review of Crawford”); Kennedy, 
735 S.E.2d at 916 (“[W]e believe Williams cannot be fairly read to supplant the ‘primary 
purpose’ test previously endorsed by the Court and as established in Melendez–Diaz and 
Bullcoming.”); United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 94 (2d Cir. 2013) (relying on 
Melendez-Diaz, Bryant, and Bullcoming¸ but finding Williams inconclusive enough to 
rely on for a clear principle); State v. Shivers, 280 P.3d 635, 637 (Az. Ct. App. 2012) 
(acknowledging the Clause’s “choppy waters”). 
10
 Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1168 (2011). In Bullcoming the majority 
claimed that the dissent “makes plain that its objection is less to the application of the 
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Supreme Court put it, with admirable delicacy, the Clause presents 
“complexities that are far from easy to resolve in light of the widely 
divergent views expressed by the justices of the United States Supreme 
Court.”11 
 In Crawford, the defendant was tried for assault and attempted 
murder; the state introduced an inculpatory tape-recording of his wife 
Sylvia (not present at trial) speaking to police in a station-house 
interrogation. The Court declared this impermissible, even though lower 
courts had found Sylvia’s statement reliable under the then-applicable 
constitutional jurisprudence. “[T]he Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure 
reliability of evidence,” wrote the Court, “but it is a procedural rather than 
a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but 
that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible 
of cross-examination.”12 Only “testimonial” evidence triggered the 
Clause’s application—this was the key.13 Justice Scalia continued:  
We leave for another day any effort to spell out a 
comprehensive definition of “testimonial.” Whatever else 
the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony 
at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former 
trial; and to police interrogations. These are the modern 
practices with closest kinship to the abuses at which the 
Confrontation Clause was directed.
14
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
Court’s decisions in Crawford and Melendez–Diaz to this case than to those pathmarking 
decisions themselves.” Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2714 n.5. 
11
 People v. Dungo, 286 P.3d 442, 447 (Cal. 2012), as modified on denial of reh’g 
(Dec. 12, 2012). 
12
 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. 
13
 See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006) (“A critical portion of 
this holding, and the portion central to resolution of the two cases now before us, is the 
phrase ‘testimonial statements.’ Only statements of this sort cause the declarant to be a 
‘witness’ within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause.”). 
14
 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
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B. MELENDEZ-DIAZ (2009) AND BULLCOMING (2011) 
 
 The applicability of the Crawford regime to forensic reports was 
addressed in Melendez-Diaz in 2009. Could Massachusetts introduce three 
“certificates of analysis” from a state lab, created at police request, 
establishing that a trafficker’s seized substances were in fact cocaine?15 
The answer, wrote Justice Scalia, was “No”: 
The documents at issue here, while denominated by 
Massachusetts law “certificates,” are quite plainly 
affidavits: declarations of facts written down and sworn to 
by the declarant before an officer authorized to administer 
oaths. . . .  [They] are functionally identical to live, in-court 
testimony, doing precisely what a witness does on direct 
examination.
16
 
 The certificates did not “directly accuse petitioner of wrongdoing,” 
but that was irrelevant.
17
 What mattered was that they “provided testimony 
against petitioner, proving one fact necessary for his conviction—that the 
substance he possessed was cocaine.”18 The Court was not swayed by the 
claim that the analysts were not “typical” of the witnesses that most 
acutely concerned the framers .
19
 The questions of autopsies came up—
“whatever the status of coroner’s reports at common law in England,” the 
Court noted, “they were not accorded any special status in American 
practice.”20 The autopsy issue was clearly in the offing.21 
                                                          
15
 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 308 (2009). 
16
 Id. at 310-11 (citations and brackets omitted). 
17
 Id. at 313-14. 
18
 Id. 
19
 Id. at 315. 
20
 Id. at 322. 
21
 The Court mentioned autopsies twice. It noted that there are other ways to test 
forensic evidence, but paused to add: “Though surely not always. Some forensic 
analyses, such as autopsies and breathalyzer tests, cannot be repeated.” Id. at 557 U.S. at 
318 n.5. 
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 In Bullcoming v. New Mexico, two years on, the issue was whether 
a lab analyst’s blood-alcohol report could be admitted, without 
confrontation, to convict Donald Bullcoming of drunk driving. “In all 
material respects,” wrote Justice Ginsburg, it was Melendez–Diaz redux: 
“a law-enforcement officer provided seized evidence to a state laboratory 
required by law to assist in police investigations.”22 This testimonial 
analysis could not be introduced by a “surrogate” from the lab who knew 
the procedures but did not “perform or observe the test.”23 The report had 
“information filled in by the arresting officer,” like the “reason the suspect 
was stopped”24 and an officer’s affirmation that he “arrested Bullcoming 
and witnessed the blood draw.”25 
 Carolyn Zabrycki, now a California prosecutor, claimed in an 
article written four years after Crawford that, despite the confusion created 
by the decision, “one type of statement has, so far, garnered consensus: 
autopsy reports.”26 Melendez-Diaz disrupted all that.27 A number of 
federal and state courts have since found autopsy reports testimonial, 
usually reasoning, as did the Eleventh Circuit, that the reports do 
“precisely what a witness does on direct examination.”28 
                                                          
22
 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2717 (2011). 
23
 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2709-10. 
24
 Id. at 2710 (citations omitted). 
25
 Id. at 2710. 
26
 Carolyn Zabrycki, Toward A Definition of “Testimonial”: How Autopsy Reports 
Do Not Embody the Qualities of A Testimonial Statement, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1093, 1099 
(2008). For this proposition she cited, id. at 1138, United States v. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d 
121, 132 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 229 (2d Cir. 2006); Smith 
v. State, 898 So. 2d 907, 916 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004); State v. Lackey, 120 P.3d 332, 
351-52 (Kan. 2005); Rollins v. State, 897 A.2d 821, 844-45 (Md. 2006); People v. Durio, 
794 N.Y.S.2d 863, 869 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005); State v. Craig, 853 N.E.2d 621, 639 (Ohio 
2006); Moreno Denoso v. State, 156 S.W.3d 166, 182 (Tex. App. 2005).  
27
 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 335, 339, 346 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
28
 United States v. Ignasiak, 667 F.3d 1217, 1230 (citations and brackets omitted). In 
addition to the cases cited below, see also State v. Locklear, 681 N.E.2d 293, 304-305 
(N.C. 2009); Wood v. State, 299 S.W.3d 200, 208-210 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009); State v. 
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C. WILLIAMS (2012) 
 
 Finally, in 2012 came Williams v. Illinois, a long, confusing 
exhibition involving a state expert who referred at trial to a DNA “profile” 
created by the private lab Cellmark that allowed her to match up defendant 
Sandy Williams’s blood and semen samples.29 A plurality led by Justice 
Alito, with the Chief and Justices Kennedy and Breyer, held that the 
Cellmark “statements” weren’t the “sort of extrajudicial statements” that 
the Clause barred.
30
 The statements were “sought not for the purpose of 
obtaining evidence to be used against petitioner, who was not even under 
suspicion at the time, but for the purpose of finding a rapist who was on 
the loose.”31 (The Court also ruled that the Cellmark statements were 
related by the expert “solely for the purpose of explaining the assumptions 
on which that opinion rests,” and so were “not offered for their truth.”32 
This article argues that underlying reports themselves are usually 
admissible under the Confrontation Clause without resort to the “not-for-
truth” device.) 
                                                                                                                                                
Davidson, 242 S.W.3d 409, 417 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (finding an autopsy report 
testimonial because prepared at request of law enforcement in anticipation of murder 
prosecution and offered to prove cause of death); Martinez v. State, 311 S.W.3d 104, 111 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2010) (concluding an autopsy report is testimonial when primary purpose 
is to establish past events, demonstrated by officer’s presence and picture-taking at 
autopsy and where statutory basis for autopsy was suspicion of death by unlawful 
means). Courts have also come out the other way. We cite the main cases below, but see 
also Banmah v. State, 87 So.3d 101, 103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (asserting that 
autopsy reports are non-testimonial since prepared pursuant to statutory duty and not 
solely for use in prosecution); People v. Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d 428, 431-432 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2011) (holding that autopsy reports are not testimonial under Confrontation Clause). 
29
 Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2227, 2229 (2012). 
30
 Id. at 2228. 
31
 Id. 
32
 Id. 
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 Justice Breyer, in a separate opinion (clearly speaking for the rest 
of the plurality), said he would adhere to the dissent in Melendez-Diaz.
33
 
The Confrontation Clause worked to disallow ex parte accusations; the 
need for cross-examination is “considerably diminished” with a statement 
made by an “accredited laboratory employee operating at a remove from 
the investigation in the ordinary course of professional work.”34 So 
anxious was Justice Breyer about the looming question of autopsies that 
he felt obliged to address it, though not part of the case. The  majority’s 
rule, he said, could bar “reliable case-specific technical information like 
autopsy reports”: 
Autopsies, like the DNA report in this case, are often 
conducted when it is not yet clear whether there is a 
particular suspect or whether the facts found in the autopsy 
will ultimately prove relevant in a criminal trial. Autopsies 
are typically conducted soon after death. And when, say, a 
victim’s body has decomposed, repetition of the autopsy 
may not be possible. What is to happen if the medical 
examiner dies before trial? Is the Confrontation Clause 
effectively to function as a statute of limitations for 
murder?
35
 
 A dissenting Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, 
and Sotomayor—in a tense opinion that referenced Nazis and the plurality 
in the same breath
36—argued that the Confrontation Clause, plain and 
                                                          
33
 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2248 (Breyer, J., concurring). See also Bullcoming, 131 S. 
Ct. at 2723 (“Whether or not one agrees with the reasoning and the result in Melendez–
Diaz, the Court today takes the new and serious misstep of extending that holding”) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
34
 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2249 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
35
 Id. at 2251 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
36
 Justice Kagan wrote that “Melendez–Diaz made yet a more fundamental point in 
response to claims of the über alles reliability of scientific evidence….” Williams, 132 S. 
Ct. at 2275. “Über alles” (“over all”) appeared in the opening line of the Nazi national 
anthem (“Deutschland, Deutschland, über alles”) and became a shorthand for the song, 
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simple, “applies with full force to forensic evidence of the kind involved” 
in the case.
37
 After all, “[c]ross-examination of the analyst is especially 
likely to reveal whether vials have been switched, samples contaminated, 
tests incompetently run, or results inaccurately recorded.”38 Given the lack 
of majority support for any particular line of reasoning in the slip 
opinions, the decisions in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, in Justice 
Kagan’s view, remained the law.39 Finally, for Justice Thomas—in the 
unwonted position of swing vote—the touchstone was form: a statement is 
testimonial only when it has the “solemnity of an affidavit or deposition,” 
even if “produced at the request of law enforcement.”40 
 
II. WHY AUTOPSIES ARE DIFFERENT  
A. THE CENTRALITY OF “PRIMARY PURPOSE” 
 
 After Williams all nine Justices agree on using some sort of 
“primary purpose” test to determine testimoniality, observed the 
California Supreme Court, but they split over “what the statement’s 
primary purpose must be.”41 The Alito plurality in Williams says the 
primary purpose, to qualify as testimonial, must be “accusing a targeted 
                                                                                                                                                
which was sufficiently associated with Hitler that the postwar republic outlawed the 
verse. 
37
 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2264-65 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
38
 Id. 
39
 Id. at 2277 (Kagan, J., dissenting). See also id. at 2265 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“I 
call Justice Alito's opinion ‘the plurality,’ because that is the conventional term for it. But 
in all except its disposition, his opinion is a dissent: Five Justices specifically reject every 
aspect of its reasoning and every paragraph of its explication.”); see also Dungo, 286 
P.3d at 465. 
40
 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2260 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
41
 People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469, 477 (Cal. 2012). 
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individual.”42 The Kagan dissenters insist that a statement is testimonial 
when it “establish[es] past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.”43 Justice Thomas dislikes the primary/non-primary 
distinction altogether, but agrees that a testimonial declarant “must 
primarily intend to establish some fact with the understanding that his 
statement may be used in a criminal prosecution.”44 
  In Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana,
45
 police took 
statements from women beaten by their partners. In Davis, Michelle 
McCottry called 911 and reported an attack nearly as it happened: “He’s 
here jumpin’ on me again . . . . He’s usin’ his fists.”46 In Hammon, Amy 
Hammon told police who arrived on the scene that her husband “[h]it me 
in the chest and threw me down,” and, in a separate room, separated from 
her husband, signed an affidavit.
47
 The first statement was non-testimonial 
because “circumstances objectively indicat[ed] that the primary purpose of 
the interrogation [was] to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing 
emergency.”48 But the second was testimonial because there was no such 
emergency and the primary purpose of the “interrogation” was to establish 
“past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”49 The test 
made clear that in some cases, like Ms. McCottry’s, even inculpatory 
                                                          
42
 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2243. Two paragraphs later there is a slight rephrasing: a 
statement is testimonial when it is the “equivalent of affidavits made for the purpose of 
proving the guilt of a particular criminal defendant at trial.” Id. 
43
 Id. at 2273 (Kagan, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, JJ.) 
(quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822).  
44
 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2261 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 
at 1167 (Thomas, J. concurring).  
45
 Davis, 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
46
 Id. at 817. 
47
 Id. at 820. 
48
 Id. at 822. 
49
 Id. Judge Ethan Greenberg of New York put it most eloquently: “A testimonial 
statement is produced when the government summons a citizen to be a witness; in a 911 
call, it is the citizen who summons the government to her aid.” People v. Moscat, 777 
N.Y.S.2d 875, 879 (Bronx Crim. Ct. 2004). 
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statements almost certain to come out at trial could nonetheless not 
constitute the sort of statement that implicates the Confrontation Clause.
50
 
 In Michigan v. Bryant the Court said that emergency was just one 
possible “factor” in the inquiry.51 “[C]ourts making a ‘primary purpose’ 
assessment,” we were told, “should not be unjustifiably restrained from 
consulting all relevant information.”52 Non-testimonial primary purposes 
so far recognized include seeking medical attention (Bryant),
53
 requesting 
aid in a 911 call (Davis),
54
 catching a dangerous rapist of unknown 
identity (Williams plurality),
55
 promising aid in a conspiracy (United 
States v. Farhane, Second Circuit),
56
 or requesting patient records (United 
States v. Bourlier, Eleventh Circuit).
57
 Declarants may have multiple 
purposes, too.
58
 You can report a body stuffed into a dumpster from 
sanitary motives, though not entirely without some suspicion of crime 
afoot. 
 A perceptive statement of the test (blending language from 
Melendez-Diaz and Bryant) was expressed by Judge Robert Sack in 
                                                          
50
 Davis, 547 U.S. at 825, said that other “clearly nontestimonial” statements 
included unwitting statements to government informants, Bourjaily v. United States, 483 
U.S. 171, 181-84 (1987), and statements from one prisoner to another, Dutton v. Evans, 
400 U.S. 74, 87-89 (1970). 
51
 Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1160 (2011) (“As Davis made clear, whether 
an ongoing emergency exists is simply one factor—albeit an important factor—that 
informs the ultimate inquiry regarding the ‘primary purpose’ of an interrogation.”). 
Justice Scalia had to concede that the Crawford analysis was “something of a multifactor 
balancing test,” using three undoubtedly hateful words to him. Id. at 1176 (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
52
 Id. at 1162. 
53
 Id. at 1157. 
54
 Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. 
55
 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2243. 
56
 United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 131-32, 162-63 (2d Cir. 2011). 
57
 United States v. Bourlier, 518 Fed.Appx. 848, 856 (11th Cir. 2013). 
58
 See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1161 (noting “problem of mixed motives on the part of 
both interrogators and declarants.”). 
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United States v. James: a “statement triggers the protections of the 
Confrontation Clause when it is made with the primary purpose of 
creating a record for use a later criminal trial.”59 The Supreme Court has 
struggled to work out a definition of “testimonial,”60 but it has given us a 
way of making that determination. Under that inquiry, modern autopsy 
reports, in our view, are usually non-testimonial. Our conclusion is not 
that there is an “autopsy exception,” but rather that when an autopsy report 
is written under conditions like those outlined in Part IV, it simply does 
not come within the prohibition. It’s not a matter of “indicia of reliability” 
or the evidence’s importance. It’s about the reasons we perform autopsies: 
the primary purpose is ordinarily not to create a record for use at a later 
criminal trial. 
 
 
 
                                                          
59
 James, 712 F.3d at 96, citing Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310–11; Bryant, 131 S. 
Ct. at 1155. In Bryant, the Court spoke of “a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court 
substitute for trial testimony.” Id. at 1155. In Bullcoming, the Court wrote that “[t]o rank 
as ‘testimonial,’ a statement must have a ‘primary purpose’ of ‘establish[ing] or prov[ing] 
past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.’” Id., 131 S. Ct. at 2714, 
citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 82. State courts use different phrasings, often with subtle but 
crucial omissions. For instance, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in State v. 
Kennedy, 229 W. Va. 756, 766 (W. Va. 2012), offered a similar test but omitting the 
“primary purpose” language in a way that echoes Justice Kagan’s dissent in Williams: “a 
testimonial statement is, generally, a statement that is made under circumstances which 
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be 
available for use at a later trial.” The California Supreme Court said a “statement is 
testimonial only if its primary purpose pertains in some fashion to a criminal 
prosecution.” Dungo, 286 P.3d at 449. 
60
 We assume the battle is lost on the attempt by the Melendez-Diaz dissenters to put 
the focus not on the quality of being “testimonial” but on the “witness,” the word the 
clause actually uses. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 343-44 (“Laboratory analysts are not 
‘witnesses against’ the defendant as those words would have been understood at the 
framing . . . . Instead, the Clause refers to a conventional ‘witness’—meaning one who 
witnesses (that is, perceives) an event that gives him or her personal knowledge of some 
aspect of the defendant’s guilt.”). 
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B. APPLYING THE “PRIMARY PURPOSE” TEST TO AUTOPSIES 
 
 In July 2013, San Mateo County Coroner Robert Foucrault 
announced that a 16-year-old girl on an Asiana Airlines flight that crashed 
in San Francisco died from blunt-injury trauma.
61
 She was hit by a fire 
truck. It seems safe to conclude that Foucrault was not animated by a 
desire to flesh out a D.A.’s case for criminal negligence against 
firefighters or to supply facts for a federal air-safety indictment against the 
pilots. He was motivated by a duty he has under a California statute to 
determine cause of death. Police did not instigate his report and it may 
never be used in a criminal trial. It happens that police were involved in 
the creation of the challenged evidence in every Supreme Court 
confrontation case discussed above: Crawford, Melendez-Diaz, 
Bullcoming, Davis, Bryant, Williams. Many courts hold that police 
involvement is even a prerequisite to testimoniality.
62
 So generally how 
involved are police with autopsies? 
 Pathologists today operate under statutes setting out their 
responsibilities. In Florida, for instance, twelve situations legally trigger 
autopsies, among them “criminal violence,” “accident,” “suicide,” death 
occurring “[s]uddenly, when in apparent good health,” or “disease 
constituting a threat to public health.”63 The New York City Office of the 
                                                          
61
 Robert Salonga & Joshua Melvin, SFO crash: Coroner says Asiana crash victim 
died after firetruck ran over her, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, July 19, 2013, available at 
www.mercurynews.com/bay-area-news/ci_23692596/coroner-reveal-cause-asiana-
passenger-death. 
62
 See, e.g., United States v. Jordan, 509 F.3d 191, 195 (4th Cir. 2007) (“To our 
knowledge, no court has extended Crawford to statements made by a declarant to friends 
or associates.”). 
63
 Fla. Stat. § 406.11(1)(a)-(c) (West 2006). Most states seem to have variations on 
this. New Mexico, for instance, provides: “When any person comes to a sudden, violent 
or untimely death or is found dead and the cause of death is unknown, anyone who 
becomes aware of the death shall report it immediately to law enforcement authorities or 
the office of the state or district medical investigator.” N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-11-5 (West 
1978). 
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Chief Medical Examiner “performs autopsies where people died in 
unexpected circumstances, unnatural deaths.”64 California’s code adds 
“unattended deaths” and enumerates modes of demise like a grim book of 
fate: “deaths due to drowning, fire, hanging, gunshot, stabbing, cutting, 
exposure, starvation, acute alcoholism, drug addiction, strangulation, 
aspiration, or . . . sudden infant death syndrome.”65 
 Autopsies, to be sure, can be the crux of a murder prosecution. In 
People v. Dungo,
66
 Reynaldo Dungo claimed he strangled his girlfriend in 
the “heat of passion”67—voluntary manslaughter at most, argued his 
lawyer.
68
 But the autopsy revealed that she was asphyxiated for “more 
than two minutes.”69 The jury knew it was no sudden impulse.70 
 But most autopsies do not lead to criminal investigations. New 
York City’s medical examiner performs an average of 5,500 autopsies a 
year, but in 2010 only 533 city residents had homicide as their cause of 
death.
71
 Not every homicide results in a criminal trial, moreover, so this 
means less than 10% of autopsy reports could possibly appear in a 
prosecution. In 2004 the Los Angeles Medical Examiner’s office took 
                                                          
64
 James, 712 F.3d at 96 (citations omitted). 
65
 Cal. Gov. Code § 27491 (West 1969). 
66
 55 Cal.4th 608, 286 P.3d 442 (2012). 
67
 Id. at 446. 
68
 Id. 
69
 Id. at 451. 
70
 Id. at 446. This case has the perhaps the best full-throated statements of why 
autopsy statements are not testimonial. Id. at 451-55 (Werdegar, J., concurring). 
71
 James, 712 F.3d at 99 n.10 (citing OCME, General Information Booklet, 
http://www. nyc.gov/html/ocme/downloads/pdf/General% 20Information/OCME% 
20General% 20Information% 20Booklet.pdf; Deaths and Death Rates by Selected 
Causes New York City—2010, 
http://www.health.ny.gov/statistics/vital_statistics/2010/table33c.htm). For another use of 
statistics in the “primary purpose” inquiry, see United States v. Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d 
1156, 1163-64, n.5 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding warrants of removal non-testimonial in part 
by noting that during a period 281,000 aliens were deported but only 17,000 federal 
immigrations were commenced). 
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9,465 cases and found that 1,121 died from homicide, 709 from suicide, 
3,090 from accidents, and 4,256 from natural causes. In other words, some 
90% of autopsies involved causes other than homicide.
72
 In a small 
suburban county like Marin County, California, 289 investigations 
reported only two homicides.
73
 
 Autopsies are associated in the American mind with criminal 
investigations—think Law & Order, Bones, NCIS, etc.—and judicial 
discussion of autopsies is often in the context of a murder trial. But 
autopsies have significant purposes besides punishment. 
 In 2007 the Centers for Disease Control analyzed autopsies in 47 
states and the District of Columbia and found them essential to monitor 
infant mortality; to gather statistics about Alzheimer’s, meningitis, 
diabetes, or cirrhosis; to track prevalence of death from noxious fumes, 
allergies, or gun accidents.
74
 Autopsies help us effectively direct clinical-
research funds.
75
 For instance, they taught us that HIV patients who died 
in hospitals could have been given antibiotics that would have extended 
their lives.
76
 They taught us that prostate cancer is best detected by early 
screening.
77
 State laws that obligate autopsies after deaths in prisons, 
                                                          
72
 Zabrycki, supra note 26 at 1125. 
73
 Marin County Sheriff’s Office, Coroner Division Annual Report, 2011, 6, 
available at http://www.marincounty.org/main/board-actions/2013/may/may-
14/~/media/Files/MarinGov/Board%20Actions/2013/20130514SOCoroner2011.pdf. 
74
 See, e.g., Donna L. Hoyert, Hsiang-Ching Kung, & Jiaquan Xu, Autopsy Patterns 
in 2003, 20(32) VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS, March 2007, at 3; see also, FastStats 
Homepage, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/homicide.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2013). 
75
 Hoyert, supra note 74 at 4. 
76
 See generally Neil A. Martinson et. al, Causes of Death in Hospitalized Adults 
With a Premortem Diagnosis of Tuberculosis: An Autopsy Study, 21(15) AIDS 2043 
(2007), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17885294. 
77
 RICHARD A. PRAYSON, DIAGNOSES FROM THE DEAD: THE BOOK OF AUTOPSY 30 
(2009). 
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orphanages, or nursing homes serve to protect the vulnerable.
78
 
Pathologists are the unsung heroes of consumer safety; they revealed that 
polyethylene bags suffocate children
79
 and that cyanide is a fatal 
fumigant.
80
 And before there was Vitamin Water, there was Radithor, the 
“radioactive water” that sold wildly until examiners weighed in.81 (“The 
Radium Water Worked Fine Until His Jaw Came Off” ran a newspaper 
headline.
82
)  
 Autopsies established that perhaps as many as 20% of hospital 
patients die each year from misdiagnoses
83—and help reduce that 
percentage by teaching doctors that, say, what they thought was a gastric 
ulcer was in fact a stomach infection with sepsis.
84
 Autopsies identify 
dangerous new street drugs—from “wood” alcohol in 1918-1985 to “bath 
salts” in 2011.86 Dr. Milton Helpern, the legendary New York City Chief 
                                                          
78
 See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22a-242(a) (West 2013) (providing that “[w]hen a 
child dies, any law enforcement officer, health care provider or other person having 
knowledge of the death shall immediately notify the coroner of the known facts 
concerning the time, place, manner and circumstances of the death” (emphasis added)). 
79
 MILTON HELPERN WITH BERNARD KNIGHT, AUTOPSY: THE MEMOIRS OF THE 
MILTON HELPERN, THE WORLD’S GREATEST MEDICAL DETECTIVE 66-71, 175-76 (1977). 
80
 DEBORAH BLUM, THE POISONER’S HANDBOOK: MURDER AND THE BIRTH OF 
FORENSIC MEDICINE IN JAZZ AGE NEW YORK 66-67, 125-26 (2010). 
81
 BLUM, supra note 80, at 179, 219 (recounting the FDA’s cease-and-desist order 
against Radithor’s manufacturer). 
82
 Ron Winslow, The Radium Water Worked Fine Until His Jaw Came Off, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 1, 1990, at A1. 
83
 PRAYSON, supra note 77, at 18. 
84
 Id. at 23-24. 
85
 BLUM, supra note 80, at 46-49. 
86
 Jane M. Prosser & Lewis S. Nelson, The Toxicology of Bath Salts: A Review of 
Synthetic Cathinones, 8 J. MED. TOXICOLOGY 33, 37 (2011); Jason Jerry, Gregory 
Collins, & David Streem, Synthetic Legal Intoxicating Drugs: The Emerging ‘Incense’ 
and ‘Bath Salt” Phenomenon, 79(4) CLEVELAND CLINIC J. OF MED. 258, 262 (2012) 
(relating that autopsy showed “bath salts” were actually form of MDPV, a powerful 
stimulant with no FDA-approved medical use). See also SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND 
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
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Examiner, proved that, contrary to popular belief, heroin addicts in the 
mid-1930s were dying in epidemic proportions not from the opiate itself 
but from malaria-infected syringes.
87
 In the 1950s, his office discovered 
that the subtle poison of household carbon monoxide was leaking from 
cooking ranges and refrigerators—a design flaw that caused many 
wrongful murder prosecutions—and saved hundreds of lives.88 Autopsies 
reveal the that fatal cocktails took Heath Ledger
89
 and Cory Monteith,
90
 
and these overdose reports almost never figure in a trial against a drug 
dealer. Nor does a quest for indictment instigate autopsies after deadly 
outbreaks of salmonella
91
 or E. coli.
92
  
                                                                                                                                                
SERVICES, DRUG ABUSE WARNING NETWORK: DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW DESIGN 
(METHODOLOGY REPORT) 13-15 (2002) (describing the DAWN program of the 
Department of Health & Human Services gathers local information to “serve as a first 
indicator of the serious consequences of drug use” from sources that include “autopsy 
results”). 
87
 HELPERN, supra note 79, at 66-71; United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1235 
n.159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (describing Hearings Before the House Select Committee on 
Crime, “Crime in America–Heroin Importation, Distribution, Packaging and 
Paraphernalia,” 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 184 (1970) (testimony of Dr. Milton Helpern, June 
27, 1970)). 
88
 HELPERN, supra note 79, at 176-83. 
89
 James Barren, Medical Examiner Rules Ledger’s Death Accidental, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 7, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/07/nyregion/07ledger.html. 
90
 Stuart Oldham, Cory Monteith Autopsy Reveals Heroin and Alcohol Caused 
Death, VARIETY, July 16, 2013, available at http://variety.com/2013/tv/news/cory-
monteith-autopsy-reveals-heroin-and-alcohol-caused-death-1200563621. 
91
 See, e.g., Salmonellosis, 2010, 38(1) MINN. DEPT. OF HEALTH: DISEASE CONTROL 
NEWSLETTER 16 (2011) (“Salmonella was isolated at autopsy from the spleen of an 18-
year-old case with sudden death”), available at 
http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/idepc/newsletters/dcn/sum10/salmonellosis.html; E.R. 
Shipp, Midwest Salmonella Cases Force Dairy to Halt Work, N.Y. TIMES, April 11, 1985 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1985/04/11/us/midwest-salmonella-cases-force-
dairy-to-halt-work.html (“[A]utopsy . . . confirmed that salmonella infection had 
contributed to the death of a 53-year-old man.”). See also James Randerson, Lack of 
Autopsies Hampering Bird Flu Fight, Warns Doctor, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 2, 2006, 
available at http://www.theguardian.com/science/2006/jan/03/infectiousdiseases.birdflu. 
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 The point is that these types of autopsies are self-evidently non-
testimonial. We should not testimonialize the work of the same neutral 
examiner in the same examining room conducting the same objective 
procedure because his subject appears to have been killed by a human 
being instead of a bacterium or the poison of a meth lab. The CDC survey 
showed that some 7.7% of deaths led to autopsies.
93
 Usually there was 
reason to suspect the naturalness of the death: 0.6% of deaths in nursing 
homes and 0.8% of deaths in hospice facilities prompted autopsies; so did 
91.8% of apparent homicides.
94
 The latter figure amounts to 15,388 
cases—equal to the number of suicides—95out of a total of 173,745 
autopsies that year.
96
 This means that over 90% of autopsy reports lacked 
even the possibility of use in a criminal trial. Creating prosecution 
evidence is not the primary purpose of autopsies in America. 
 A proper autopsy can never itself establish someone’s guilt.97 An 
ancient physician may have found that Julius Caesar suffered 23 bodily 
wounds, but only an eyewitness or confession could prove tyrannicide. 
From the impartial examiner’s view, the task is always the same: to show 
that a human being died from a particular cause.
98
 There is an impressive 
                                                                                                                                                
94  
KNDO 23, Autopsy Performed on Richland E. coli Victim, 
http://www.nbcrightnow.com/global/story.asp?s=6026797; Tim Hay, Autopsy on 
Woman, 95, Who May Have Died Due to E. coli, OAKLAND TRIB., Nov. 2, 2003. 
93
 Hoyert, supra note 74, at 2. 
94
 Id. at 3. 
95
 Id. at 13. 
96
 Id. at 2. 
97
 See, e.g., Kennedy, 735 S.E.2d at 917 (“[T]he autopsy report at issue does not, in 
and of itself, prove the guilt of Kennedy and is not inherently inculpatory.”) This is the 
error made by Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Evidence and the Confrontation Clause After 
Crawford v. Washington, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 791, 852 (2007). She writes that an autopsy 
report “really does squarely fit into the category of the testimonial. This cannot and 
should not be doubted. It is created as part of an ongoing investigation in order to 
produce evidence. It is prepared with an eye toward future criminal prosecution.” Not so. 
98
 RICHARD A. PRAYSON, DIAGNOSES FROM THE DEAD: THE BOOK OF AUTOPSY 59 
(2009); see, e.g., People v. Washington, 654 N.E.2d 967, 969 (N.Y. 1995) (agreeing that 
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Sherlockian specificity here: an examiner might be able to show 
strangulation from harm to “neck organs consistent with fingertips,” 
“pinpoint hemorrhages in her eyes” indicating lack of oxygen, and self-
inflicted tongue biting.
99
 Another pathologist might state that the “amount 
of pressure required to stop the flow of blood from the brain is ‘about 4.4 
pounds’”100 and that death resulted when this force was kept up for “three 
to six minutes.”101 These discoveries disclose a great deal—but never the 
perpetrator’s identity. The report, moreover, can be used by both sides.102 
Indeed, pathologists’ work also often terminates a prosecution by, say, 
establishing a time of death that matches a suspect’s alibi103 or by allowing 
the defense to show that the cause of death was a “ruptured congenital 
brain aneurysm” and that a fistfight “was not a contributing cause.”104 
 Each autopsy report must be considered individually, but most 
autopsies fall short of testimoniality as defined by the Supreme Court. 
Consider Bullcoming (“A document created solely for an ‘evidentiary 
                                                                                                                                                
the New York City’s Office of the Medical Examiner’s “mandate . . . is clear, to provide 
an impartial determination of the cause of death.”). 
99
 Dungo, 286 P.3d at 446. 
100
 Leach, 980 N.E.2d at 576. 
101
 Id. at 595. 
102
 Dungo, 286 P.3d at 453 (citation omitted). (“[A]n autopsy physician documents 
his or her observations of the decedent’s injuries partly to provide evidence for court, but 
detailed documentation of the pathologist’s observations is also important to support or 
refute interpretations and to serve as a record”). 
103
 See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2244 (“When lab technicians are asked to work on the 
production of a DNA profile, they often have no idea what the consequences of their 
work will be. In some cases, a DNA profile may provide powerful incriminating evidence 
against a person who is identified either before or after the profile is completed. But in 
others, the primary effect of the profile is to exonerate a suspect who has been charged or 
is under investigation.”). 
104
 Leach, 980 N.E.2d at 591 (emphasis added); see also id. (“[E]ven when the police 
suspect foul play and the medical examiner’s office is aware of this suspicion, an autopsy 
might reveal that the deceased died of natural causes and, thus, exonerate a suspect.”). 
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purpose’ . . . made in aid of a police investigation”105); Bryant (“a 
statement . . . procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court 
substitute for trial testimony”106)]; Melendez–Diaz (“the sole purpose of 
the affidavits was to provide prima facie evidence of the composition, 
quality, and the net weight of the analyzed substance”)107; and Davis 
(statements under formal police interrogation are an “obvious substitute 
for live testimony”).108 Surely if a man bleeding to death in a parking lot 
can identify his shooter to police without “testifying”—the facts of 
Bryant—a pathologist can likewise relate conclusions about cause of death 
(not identity of suspect) without an intent to accuse. The pathologist, 
moreover, can deliver his statement without the medium of any police 
officer.
109
 
 The drug certificates in Melendez-Diaz and blood-alcohol analyses 
in Bullcoming were testimonial because the labs tested the powder or 
blood for one reason only: enforcing criminal laws on drugs and drunk 
driving.
110
 Other people may have wanted the evidence for civil suits 
                                                          
105
 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2717. 
106
 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155. 
107
 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311 (citation omitted). 
108
 Davis, 547 U.S. at 830. 
109
 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1173. The statement derived exclusively from the officers’ 
recollection at trial of what the victim said. 
110
 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311 (“[U]nder Massachusetts law the sole purpose of 
the affidavits was to provide ‘prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the 
net weight’ of the analyzed substance”); Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2720 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring); State v. Aragon, 225 P.3d 1280, 1287 (2010) (“The chemical forensic 
reports at issue in this case are inadmissible absent confrontation, because although it is 
the ‘business’ of the Southern Crime Laboratory, a public agency, to analyze substances 
for narcotic content, the laboratory’s purpose for preparing chemical forensic reports is 
for their use in court, not as a function of the laboratory’s administrative activities.” See 
also City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 91 P.3d 591, 593-96 (Nev. 2004) (finding a nurse’s 
affidavit about conditions of blood-drawing from drunk-driving suspect was testimonial 
since prepared solely for prosecution.). Cf. United States v. DeLeon, 678 F.3d 317, 325 
(4th Cir. 2012) (“[O]urs is also not a case in which the social worker operated as an agent 
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(those injured by Donald Bullcoming’s car, the K-Mart that employed Mr. 
Melendez-Diaz, etc.), but prosecution is the state’s reason, and the drug 
and alcohol tests were specifically done at police request. In Bullcoming, 
the state didn’t even try to suggest another purpose, like medical 
treatment.
111
 So, too, in the case with forensic disciplines like 
fingerprinting, ballistics, and arson analysis—designed, one and all, to 
prove criminality. But as shown, autopsies are mostly not conducted with 
the primary motivation of generating evidence for a criminal trial. 
 
C. AUTOPSIES ARE GENERALLY NEUTRALLY PERFORMED 
 
 Forensic evidence sways juries because it is neutral-seeming and 
scientific. This is why flawed or misleadingly used forensic evidence often 
lies behind a false conviction. Judges know this. The Wall Street Journal 
reported last year that recent court decisions and law-enforcement policies 
increasingly cast doubt on evidentiary “staples” like “hair samples, burn 
patterns, bite marks, ballistics evidence and handwriting analysis.”112 So 
are autopsies any better? 
 Yes—and the chief difference is that the pathologist who performs 
an autopsy is not an arm of law enforcement but a doctor under a civil-
statutory duty to investigate mysterious deaths.
113
 Most examiners are 
                                                                                                                                                
of law enforcement. . . . [She] did not act at the behest of law enforcement, as there was 
no active criminal investigation when she and Jordan spoke.”). 
111
 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring.). 
112
 Jack Nicas, Flawed Evidence Under a Microscope, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2013, at 
A3. See, e.g., United States v. Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d 567, 573-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(Rakoff, J.) (stating that “ballistics examination not only lacks the rigor of science but 
suffers from greater uncertainty than many other kinds of forensic evidence” and 
contrasting it with the reliability of a “physician’s diagnosis.”). 
113
 See, e.g., Davis, 547 U.S. at 823 (“If 911 operators are not themselves law 
enforcement officers, they may at least be agents of law enforcement when they conduct 
interrogations of 911 callers.”). 
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actually private M.D.s under contract.
114
 Yet Crawford’s concern was the 
“involvement of government officers in the production of testimonial 
evidence.”115 When Justice Scalia blasted the notion of “neutral” 
government officials, he was taking aim at Washington State’s claim 
about neutral police officers.
116
 Being on the government payroll—like a 
National Weather Service forecaster or Amtrak conductor—does not make 
you adversarial to criminals. Crawford had in mind officials with an 
“investigative and prosecutorial function.”117 But a pathologist’s natural 
colleagues are not crime-lab technicians but dentists, radiologists, 
neurologists, and anatomists.
118
 Even routine field-written statements of 
Border Patrol agents can be non-testimonial, regardless of whether they 
later are offered at a smuggling trial.
119
 
                                                          
114
 See Coroner Table Generator, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, available at 
http://www.npr.org/buckets/news/2011/01/coroner-stats/county-table.php?year=2010); 
See also COMMITTEE ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIENCE 
COMMUNITY, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, 
Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward 248 (2009) 
[hereinafter “NAS Report”] (“[M]edical examiners are almost always physicians, are 
appointed, and are often pathologists or forensic pathologists.”). 
115
 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 53. 
116
 Id. at 66 (“The Framers would be astounded to learn that ex parte testimony could 
be admitted against a criminal defendant because it was elicited by ‘neutral’ government 
officers.”). 
117
 Id. at 53 (“That interrogators are police officers rather than magistrates does not 
change the picture either. Justices of the peace conducting examinations under the Marian 
statutes were not magistrates as we understand that office today, but had an essentially 
investigative and prosecutorial function.”). 
118
 HELPERN, supra note 79, at 28. 
119
 United States v. Morales, 2013 WL 3306395, No. 12-10069, *4 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(citation omitted) (“[A] Border Patrol agent uses the form in the field to document basic 
information, to notify the aliens of their administrative rights, and to give the aliens a 
chance to request their preferred disposition. The Field 826s are completed whether or 
not the government decides to prosecute the aliens or anyone else criminally. The nature 
and use of the Field 826 makes clear that its primary purpose is administrative, not for 
use as evidence at a future criminal trial.”). 
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 Unlike Crawford’s interrogators,120 pathologists do not ask leading 
questions or interpret vague answers. They have no stake in the 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. They are not praised for 
successful prosecutions or blamed for acquittals. They do not carry guns 
or badges or deceive or cajole. They investigate causes of death, not 
crimes. They conclude on the conditions of a body, not on who bears guilt 
for it.
121
 The National Association of Medical Examiners states that the 
“[p]erformance of a forensic autopsy is the practice of medicine.”122 If we 
are told in Giles v. California (2008) that reports of “abuse and 
intimidation” during medical treatment never require confrontation,123 
what is the difference here, except less risk of falsity?
124
 A routine autopsy 
report—cool, impartial, precise—is akin to a careful hospital record.125 
 Certainly the typical testimonial infirmities are absent. No issues of 
perception—foggy? dark? no glasses?—exist. Concerns about 
                                                          
120
 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53. 
121
 See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2251 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The declarant [in 
Crawford, Davis, and Bryant] was essentially an adverse witness making an accusatory, 
testimonial statement—implicating the core concerns of the Lord Cobham-type 
affidavits. But here the DNA report sought, not to accuse petitioner, but instead to 
generate objectively a profile of a then-unknown suspect’s DNA from the semen he left 
in committing the crime.”). 
122
 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, FORENSIC AUTOPSY 
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 4 (2006), available at 
www.mtf.org pdf name standards 2006.pdf ; see also NAS REPORT, supra note 114, at 
252 (“The medical examiner is first and foremost a physician, whose education, training, 
and experience is in the application of the body of medicine”). 
123
 Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 376 (2008). See also United States v. DeLeon, 
678 F.3d 317, 327 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that statements by child victim of abuse, 
before his murder, to treatment manager of Air Force medical program were admissible 
under Rule 803(4) and non-testimonial). 
124
 Cf. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1161 n.12 (“[T]he severe injuries of the victim would 
undoubtedly also weigh on the credibility and reliability that the trier of fact would afford 
to the statements.”). 
125
 Cf. Dixon v. Superior Court, 170 Cal.App.4th 1271, 1278 (2009) (holding that an 
autopsy report is a public record under California law).  
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deteriorating memory vanish because examiners dictate or take notes 
while they (as they put it) “cut their case.”126 (The real memory problem 
can arise when prosecutors call examiners who perform dozens or 
hundreds of autopsies a year, months or years after the procedure.) Verbal 
ambiguity is rarely a problem when speaking of “drowning due to the 
effects of atherosclerotic heart disease and cocaine use” (Whitney 
Houston)
127
 or a “[b]ullet wound of entrance at the level of the 6th cervical 
vertebra 5 cm. to the right of the midline” (John Dillinger).128 Is there a 
risk of fabrication?
129
 Professor Paul Giannelli wrote a paper on crime-lab 
error and fraud and offered precisely one example of a pathologist’s 
falsification.
130
 If Bryant could say that people in mortal distress are 
                                                          
126
 PRAYSON, supra note 77, at 45, 56-57; Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 345 (Kennedy, 
J., dissenting) (“A typical witness must recall a previous event that he or she perceived 
just once, and thus may have misperceived or misremembered. But an analyst making a 
contemporaneous observation need not rely on memory; he or she instead reports the 
observations at the time they are made.”). 
127
 See Kristy McCracken, Whitney Houston Autopsy Report 9, AUTOPOSYFILES.ORG 
(Feb. 12, 2012), available at, 
http://www.autopsyfiles.org/reports/Celebs/houston,%20whitney_report.pdf. 
128
 See Frank J. Walsh, John Dillinger Autopsy Report 3, AUTOPSYFILES.ORG (July 
23, 1934), available at 
http://www.autopsyfiles.org/reports/Other/dillinger,%20john_report.pdf. 
129
 See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1157 (finding that certain types of hearsay are non-
testimonial because, produced for purposes other use at trial, they pose a significantly 
reduced “prospect of fabrication”). 
130
 Paul C. Giannelli, in The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The 
Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 439, 449–53 (1997), 
tells the sordid story of pathologist Ralph Erdmann, convicted for falsified reports in the 
1980s. His lies were just bizarre: at times they favored the prosecution (he said a child 
died from a blow but in fact it was drowning); at others the defense (he identified 
pneumonia as the cause when it was actually a gunshot to the head). Couldn’t the absence 
of fraud cases be the more remarkable fact? In James, 712 F.3d at 103–04 the defendant 
made an apparently implausible claim that the examiner was bribed to change a cause of 
death for a cut of the insurance money. In People v. Beeler, 891 P.2d 153, 168 (Cal. 
1995), a pathologist testified that another pathologist named Dr. Bolduc “had caused 
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unlikely to “fabricat[e],”131 we might observe that board-certified 
pathologists, too, have other things on their mind—namely, accuracy—
and no inherent motive to lie.
132
 As Lieutenant Bowers of the Alameda 
County Coroner’s Bureau told us, a pathologist’s livelihood is premised 
on “credibility,” and a “tainted” doctor will struggle to find a job in county 
offices or lucrative defense work.
133
 
 The best claim for cross-examination is to test competence. 
Pathologists may train for years but they are still humans exercising 
judgment.
134
 Mistakes can be made and conclusions at times are 
subjective. Yet unlike a good deal of evidence at criminal trials, autopsy 
reports are carefully substantiated, allowing review by others inside an 
examiner’s office or opposing experts.135 A pathologist’s tools are not 
interrogations but scalpels and microscopes. We draw no distinction 
between factual observation and judgment—which was ruled out in 
                                                                                                                                                
‘quite a bit of consternation’ in a prior murder case by basing his conclusion regarding 
the cause of death on a police report rather than on medical evidence.” 
131
 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1161 (“[T]he victim’s injuries could be so debilitating as to 
prevent her from thinking sufficiently clearly to understand whether her statements are 
for the purpose of addressing an ongoing emergency or for the purpose of future 
prosecution.”). 
132
 See, e.g., Lackey, 120 P.3d at 351 (noting that circumstances of autopsy are such 
that “medical examiner would have little incentive to fabricate the results”). 
133
 Interview with Lieutenant R. Bowers, Coroner’s Bureau Unit Commander, in 
Alameda County, Cal., (Aug. 7, 2013) (notes on file with author). 
134
 See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 321 (“Contrary to respondent’s and the dissent’s 
suggestion, there is little reason to believe that confrontation will be useless in testing 
analysts’ honesty, proficiency, and methodology—the features that are commonly the 
focus in the cross-examination of experts.”); id. at 320 (observing that drug-testing 
“requires the exercise of judgment and presents a risk of error that might be explored on 
cross-examination”); United States v. Ignasiak, 667 F.3d 1217, 1232 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(“[T]he observational data and conclusions contained in the autopsy reports are the 
product of the skill, methodology, and judgment of the highly trained examiners who 
actually performed the autopsy.”). 
135
 See, e.g., Dungo, 286 P.3d at 452. 
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Bullcoming
136—but merely point out that even when discretion is required 
the work of an examiner is still almost entirely a matter of clinical 
recordation. Even Justice Scalia noted that although “reliability” alone 
does not determine non-testimoniality, it can certainly “supplement” such 
a finding.
137
 
 Pathologists do not become part of the prosecution as even a 
neutral witness does. A bystander to a crime may only want to relate what 
she saw, but by the time she is questioned by detectives and handed to the 
D.A. to be prepared for the stand, the risk of tilted testimony or one-side-
only elicitations is obvious. Not with pathologists. Autopsy reports do not 
pose the dangers caused by custodial interrogation. Police and 
prosecutors—when kept appropriately separate from the doctor, as 
discussed below—cannot sway the report’s substance, or create a 
favorable record through suggestive questioning, or see to the omission of 
defendant-friendly evidence. They simply have no say. There is no risk 
that pathologist, preparing to make his “Y” incision in the body, will tell 
only one side of the story, because there is only one side: cause of death. 
“We are not interested in whodunit,” said Dr. Helpern. “All we want to 
know is what did it.”138 
 
D. PATHOLOGISTS TODAY ARE NOT THE CORONERS OF THE 
COMMON LAW 
 
 A footnote in Crawford claimed that “several early American 
authorities flatly rejected any special status for coroner statements.”139 It 
                                                          
136
 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at  2714–15; Navarette, 294 P.3d at 438. This in turn rules 
out the approach in cases like Rollins, 866 A.2d at 954 and Lackey, 120 P.3d at 351–52. 
137
 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1176 (Scalia, J., concurring). The majority agreed. Id. at 
1155 (“In making the primary purpose determination, standard rules of hearsay, designed 
to identify some statements as reliable, will be relevant.”). 
138
 HELPERN, supra note 79. 
139
 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47 n.2; see also Giles, 554 U.S. at 399–400 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (“Coroner’s statements seem to have had special status [in English 
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cited two antebellum decisions and the treatise of the great Michigan 
Justice Thomas Cooley.
140
 The footnote has misled judges and 
commentators and in any event is wrong.
141
 What Cooley actually wrote 
was closer to the reverse: he said there are “exceptions” to the rule that 
witnesses can be confronted in criminal cases, one being where a “witness 
was sworn . . . before a coroner.”142 The example reminds us that 
pathologists, unlike coroners, do not “swear” anyone or take evidence 
from any place other than their examining table. In the cases cited by 
Justice Scalia (respectively, from 1844 and 1858) the “coroner statements” 
were statements to a coroner, during a deposition, which the coroner 
submitted directly to the court.
143
 This is classic ex parte stuff—in a word, 
an inquest (which has the same root as “inquisition”).144 It is the opposite 
of the practice of the modern clinical pathologist, who with at least eight 
                                                                                                                                                
precedents] that may sometimes have permitted the admission of prior unconfronted 
testimonial statements despite lack of cross-examination. But, if so, that special status 
failed to survive the Atlantic voyage.”). 
140
 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47 n.2. 
141
 James, 712 F.3d at 108 n.2 (Eaton, J., concurring); Mnookin, supra note 97, at 
852 (“Crawford itself raises and then appears to reject the possibility of a special 
exception for coroner statements . . . .”). 
142
 THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 318 (1868). 
143
 State v. Campbell, 30 S.C.L. 124, 124–25 (1844) (“The question is this. Is it 
indispensable, by the rules of legal evidence, that the defendant, Daniel Campbell, must 
have been present; or, at least, had an opportunity of hearing and examining R. Kelly, 
when his depositions were taken, upon the inquest holden over the body of the deceased, 
A. Defee, in order to render such depositions competent evidence against Daniel 
Campbell, upon his trial before the jury for the murder of Defee; when the witness died, 
after such depositions had been taken?”); State v. Houser, 26 Mo. 431, 440 (1858) 
(discussing coroner statements in England). 
144
 Campbell, 30 S.C.L at 126–132; Houser, 26 Mo. at 436 (“[S]uch testimony has 
never been permitted in this country, and in England its admissibility has been altogether 
placed upon the peculiar dignity and importance attached to the office of coroner; and no 
such reasons exist here.”). 
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years of medical training
145
 starts with the premise that “‘I’m going to use 
my eyes, and I'm going to use my hands to figure out what caused the 
death.’”146 This is true to the etymology of “autopsy,” a mid-17th-century 
derivation of the Greek autopsia (“seeing with one’s own eyes”), which 
first appears in Westlaw’s annals only in 1843.147 
 Crawford said, quite rightly, that applying a constitutional clause 
to a “phenomenon that did not exist at the time of its adoption . . . involves 
some degree of estimation.”148 Doesn’t that require us to look into what a 
coroner did when John Marshall strode the earth? James Wilson, the 
wisest framer when it came to questions of criminal procedure, described 
coroners as elected laymen, complementary to sheriffs, whose duty it was 
to summon juries and accumulate evidence.
149
 No founding-era coroner, 
wrote Dr. Helpern, actually “knew anything about the medical aspects of a 
case,” and when they bothered at all, their medical judgments were 
nothing more than crude layman’s guesses.150 Fast-forward to the 
Louisiana Supreme Court describing the coroner’s duties at common law, 
circa 1852: to “hold an inquest on the body;” to “require, at the public 
expense, the services of physicians, to give their opinion on the subject”; 
to “institute a public prosecution against the supposed perpetrator of the 
                                                          
145
 See, e.g., NAS REPORT, supra note 114, at 256 (“Forensic pathologists are 
physicians who have completed, at a minimum, four years of medical school and three to 
four years of medical specialty training in anatomical pathology or anatomical and 
clinical pathology, followed by an accredited fellowship year in forensic pathology.”). 
146
 Ignasiak, 667 F.3d at 1232 n.19. 
147
 Fox v. Walsh, 5 Rob. (LA) 222, 223 (1843). By contrast, “coroner” first appears 
in Westlaw in a case from 1723. Robins’s Lessee v. Bush, 1 H. & McH. 50, 53 (Md. 
Prov. 1723). 
148
 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36. 
149
 KERMIT L. HALL AND MARK DAVID HALL, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES 
WILSON VOL. 2 at 1017-18 (2007). 
150
 HELPERN, supra note 79 (discussing the colonial and early American practice of 
coroners). 
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deed”; and to “cause [the guilty] to be arrested.”151 This is all a far cry 
from the work of the medical examiner today. 
 In 1840 Charles Dickens was part of a coroner’s inquest into an 
infant’s death. A beadle assembled twelve men, brought them to a morgue, 
and, with the coroner (a surgeon and ex-Member of Parliament), exhibited 
the body.
152
 Could the difference from modern-day practice be greater? A 
jury able to converse with a member of the prosecutorial apparatus and no 
defense presence to speak of? Jurors personally confronting (and recoiling 
at) ghastly evidence? What did the coroner or beadle say to these juror-
witnesses, anyway? An English treatise from 1883 (the year the Brooklyn 
Bridge opened), cited by Justice Thomas in Williams, states that coroners 
were “charged with investigating suspicious deaths by asking local 
citizens if they knew ‘who [was] culpable either of the act or of the 
force.’”153 Even in 1925 New York coroners still gathered evidence from 
witnesses and displayed bodies. In The Great Gatsby, Fitzgerald describes 
a coroner brought in by police; he shows George Wilson’s corpse to 
Myrtle’s sister and takes her sworn statement that Myrtle did not know Jay 
Gatsby—not exactly medical testimony.154 Around this time New York 
City began to replace coroners with full-time pathologists—after the 
scandalizing 1915 Wallstein Report revealed that coroners, most of them 
bribe-hungry political hacks, were guilty of all the ineptitude one might 
expect of plumbers and saloonkeepers—literally—given the task of 
sophisticated medical evaluation.
155
 
                                                          
151
 State v. Parker, 7 La. Ann. 83, 84 (1852). 
152
 CLAIRE TOMALIN, CHARLES DICKENS: A LIFE, xxxix-xl Penguin 2011. 
153
 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2262 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing 1 J. STEPHEN, A 
HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 217–218 (Routledge/Thoemmes Press 
1883) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
154
 F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY 163-64 (Scribner 1925). 
155
 HELPERN, supra note 79 (describing the professionalization of autopsy work in 
the 20th century); Blum, supra note 80, at 19-21. 
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 The triumph of science made the advancement possible.
156
 In the 
early 1800s, we still tested for poison by feeding animals a victim’s last 
meal.
157
 Coroners still exist today, but they are largely elected officials 
who never undertake actual medical work. The word “coroner,” some 
three centuries older than the word “autopsy,” comes from the Anglo-
French corouner, or keeper of the Crown’s pleas.158 In olde England, only 
the king examined corpses, just as he was the only man with knights 
enough to enforce the law. (Hence the two meanings of “court.”) A 
common-law coroner was an inquisitor.
159
 It was a different office in a 
different age. 
 
E. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS  
 
 Our argument seeks only to apply Supreme Court precedent to 
autopsy reports. But many important policy considerations nonetheless 
loom, revolving around the notion (as one court wrote) that it is “against 
                                                          
156
 For a short history of the development, see NAS Report, supra note 114, at 241-
42 (“In 1877, Massachusetts became the first state to replace its coroners with medical 
examiners, who were required to be physicians.”). 
157
 Blum, supra note 80, at 1. 
158
 See, e,g., “coroner,” Dictionary.com, at 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/coroner?s=t (last accessed January 11, 2014).  
Some states distinguish between “coroner reports” and “autopsy reports,” see Lackey, 
120 P.3d at 203, or between “coroners” and “medical examiners,” see Dungo, 286 P.3d at 
453 (“A California county may choose to employ an appointed medical examiner in place 
of a coroner. In such a county, the medical examiner exercises the statutory powers and 
duties of the coroner.”). Other states eschew these dichotomies. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 
24-11-4 (West 1978) (“As used in the New Mexico Statutes Annotated, 1978 
Compilation, ‘coroner’ means the district medical investigator.”).  
159
 Campbell, 30 S.C.L. at 134 (“If the witnesses examined on a coroner’s inquest be 
dead or beyond sea, their depositions may be read; for the coroner is an officer appointed, 
on the behalf of the public, to make inquiry about the matter within his jurisdiction.”); see 
also NAS Report, supra note 114, at 241 (“The [coroner’s] office originally was created 
to provide a local official whose primary duty was to protect the financial interest of the 
crown in criminal proceedings.”). 
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society's interests to permit the unavailability of the medical examiner 
who prepared the report to preclude the prosecution of a homicide 
case,”160 especially with such reliable, non-accusatory evidence. The 
Williams plurality added another: a rule that operated to exclude neutral 
lab evidence would “encourage prosecutors to forgo DNA testing and rely 
instead on older forms of evidence, such as eyewitness identification, that 
are less reliable.”161 
 Years can pass between an autopsy and a prosecution. The 
examiner might be unavailable by the time of trial. In one Illinois case, 
four gang members killed three teenagers in 1979: two were convicted 
soon thereafter; one was arrested in California in 1988 and pleaded guilty; 
the last was only convicted in 1992.
162
 A right, too rigid, can harden into 
wrong, as the poet said, and we should look doubtfully on a misinterpreted 
right of confrontation that allows murderers to escape justice by avoiding 
arrest or delaying trial long enough.
163
 This would effectively impose a 
“statute of limitations” on one of the few crimes that knows no time 
limit.
164
 
 Autopsy reports, unlike drug substance tests, cannot be 
replicated.
165
 Disinterment or cold storage is sometimes an option but 
                                                          
160
 Dungo, 286 P.3d at 457 (quoting Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d at 869). 
161
 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2228 (Alito, J.); id. at 2251 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]o 
bar admission of the out-of-court records at issue here could undermine, not fortify, the 
accuracy of factfinding at a criminal trial. . . . An interpretation of the Clause that risks 
greater prosecution reliance upon less reliable evidence cannot be sound.”). 
162
 Leach, 980 N.E.2d at 592 (citing People v. Caballero, 794 N.E.2d 251 (Ill. 2002)). 
In Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1164, the shooter was arrested a year after the killing. In Lackey, 
120 P.3d at 196, Lackey committed the crime in 1982 and fled to Canada and was only 
caught in Alabama in 2002. 
163
 ALEXANDER POPE, ESSAY ON MAN, THIRD EPISTLE 193-94 (Mark Pattison ed., 6th 
ed. 1878). 
164
 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2251 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
165
 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 318 n.5 (“Some forensic analyses, such as autopsies 
and breathalyzer tests, cannot be repeated.”); Dungo, 286 P.3d at 457 (quoting Durio, 794 
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another complete autopsy never is. It is true that evidence can also be lost 
forever with, say, an eyewitness who never testifies and then dies. The 
difference is that with most witnesses testimonial infirmities are usually 
important, whereas with autopsies, they almost never are. This is a policy 
argument, but the Supreme Court has not been above indulging in them 
itself. Melendez-Diaz, for one, said that the “prospect of confrontation” 
would “deter fraudulent analysis,”166 but fraud is a problem quite separate 
from testimoniality. 
 A wealthy county like Marin in the San Francisco Bay Area may 
have two homicides a year, but across the water in Alameda County—
home to Oakland—examiners might perform one or two homicide 
autopsies a day. Dr. Thomas Beaver, that county’s chief pathologist, 
estimates that he is under subpoena to appear in court every single day.
167
 
He told us that a rule finding autopsy reports to be testimonial would force 
examiners’ offices like his to choose between time on their work and 
letting prosecutions fail.
168
 
 Finally, the rule of the Williams dissenters—a statement is 
testimonial if made primarily to prove events “potentially relevant to later 
criminal prosecution”169—is simply too diffuse.170 What wouldn’t be 
                                                                                                                                                
N.Y.S.2d at 869) (“Unlike other forensic tests, an autopsy cannot be replicated by another 
pathologist.”). 
166
 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 318-19. 
167
 Author interview with Dr. Thomas Beaver, Chief Forensic Pathologist, Alameda 
County, California, August 6, 2013 (notes on file with author). 
168
 Id. The Melendez-Diaz majority made clear that even relatively insignificant 
evidence, if testimonial, cannot avoid confrontation. Id., 557 U.S. at 314. “For the sake of 
these negligible benefits,” replied the dissent, “the Court threatens to disrupt forensic 
investigations across the country.” Id. at 340-41 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The majority’s 
position seems short-sighted: the evidence’s significance at trial should matter, just like it 
did for the framers concerned about the sure damnation of secret accusations. 
169
 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2273 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas’s statement 
of this part of the rule is similar, but he adds the formality requirement. Id. at 2261 
(“[T]he declarant must primarily intend to establish some fact with the understanding that 
his statement may be used in a criminal prosecution.”). 
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“potentially” relevant? (This article, we hope, is potentially relevant to 
prosecutions.) Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming affirmed that business 
records are ordinarily admissible without confrontation, even though 
potentially relevant to a later criminal prosecution.
171
 For Fortune 500 
companies, most business records are potentially relevant to criminal 
charges; multinational corporations keep due-diligence inquiries for FCPA 
subpoenas, compliance-mad hedge funds catalog emails to fend off 
insider-trading charges, etc. Or a pharmacist may know that her legally 
mandated logs of pseudoephedrine purchases will be used against meth 
dealers; the logs are still non-testimonial business records.
172
 The 
dissenters’ test really turns on the “primary purpose” and not the 
“potentially relevant” part. The inquiry is into the totality of circumstances 
under which the record was prepared.
173
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
170
 United States v. Morales, 2013 WL 3306395, at *4 (9th Cir. 2013) (quotations 
omitted) (stating that a Border Patrol’s field-written statement is not “‘testimonial’ due to 
the ‘mere possibility’ that it could be used in a later criminal prosecution”); United States 
v. Mendez, 514 F.3d 1035, 1046 (10th Cir. 2008) (“That a piece of evidence [a drug 
ledger] may become ‘relevant to later criminal prosecution’ does not automatically place 
it within the ambit of ‘testimonial,’ otherwise ‘any piece of evidence which aids the 
prosecution would be testimonial’”). 
171
 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 324; Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2720. Some state 
courts relied on the business and public records hearsay exception in allowing the 
admission of autopsy reports or their use by experts. These exceptions are contiguous 
with the primary purpose test: if a report is created primarily for use in a prosecution it is 
inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) or 803(8) or state analogues. 
172
 United States v. Towns, 718 F.3d 404, 410-11 (5th Cir. 2013). 
173
 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1162 (“In determining whether a declarant’s statements are 
testimonial, courts should look to all of the relevant circumstances.”); Williams, 132 S. 
Ct. at 2243 (Alito, J.); Dungo, 283 P.3d at 458 (Chin, J., concurring). 
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III. WHEN AN AUTOPSY REPORT IS NON-TESTIMONIAL 
A. FORMAL SEPARATION 
 
 Before Melendez-Diaz, courts regularly held that autopsy reports 
were admissible as non-testimonial business or public records.
174
 Since 
that decision the most important factor for judges undertaking the primary-
purpose inquiry with autopsy reports has been the degree of police 
involvement in the report’s creation.175 For that reason the best way to 
avoid a confrontation problem is to ensure that an examiner’s work is 
maximally independent of police and prosecutorial influence. We looked 
at federal circuit and state supreme courts that ruled on this issue since 
Melendez-Diaz. Most of them declined, properly in our view, to set out a 
categorical rule about whether autopsies are testimonial.
176
 
                                                          
174
 State v. Craig, 853 N.E.2d 621, 638 (Ohio 2006) (holding that autopsy reports are 
admissible non-testimonial public or business records); United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 
227, 236-37 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that autopsy reports are admissible as business 
records and are non-testimonial “even where the declarant is aware that [the report] may 
be available for later use at trial”); People v. Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2005) (exempting autopsy report from Crawford under business-record exception); 
Rollins v. State, 866 A.2d 926, 954 (Md. App. 2005) (holding that autopsy reports are 
non-testimonial under business records exception provided findings reported are “routine, 
descriptive and not analytical” and do not report “contested conclusions”); State v. Cutro, 
618 S.E.2d 890 (S.C. 2005) (holding that autopsy reports are non-testimonial public 
records). 
175
 See Dungo, 286 P.3d 442 at 454 (“[T]he court’s Crawford jurisprudence suggests 
that testimonial character depends, to some extent, on the degree to which the statement 
was produced by or at the behest of government agents for use in a criminal 
prosecution”). This specific factor has also been determinative in post-Melendez-Diaz 
confrontation cases outside the autopsy context. In Conners v. State, 92 So.3d 676, 684 
(Miss. 2012), the defendant claimed he couldn’t have shot two people in his trailer since 
he was unconscious under heavy drugs. At trial the state disproved it in part with blood-
toxicology tests, but the court found that the tests were “performed at the request of the 
Pike County Sheriff’s Department with the results to be used in the prosecution.” Id. at 
684. 
176
 See, e.g., James, 712 F.3d at 88 (“[E]ven if these cases cast doubt on any 
categorical designation of certain forensic reports as admissible in all cases, the autopsy 
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 In United States v. Moore, drug conspirators got life for a spate of 
crimes including murder.
177
 The then-Chief D.C. Medical Examiner 
testified about autopsy reports placed into evidence.
178
 The D.C. Circuit 
saw testimonial reports, “document[s] created solely for an evidentiary 
purpose made in aid of a police investigation.”179 For instance, observed 
the court: 
 The Office of the Medical Examiner was “required” by the 
D.C. Code to investigate deaths when requested by the 
Metropolitan Police Department or U.S. Attorney’s Office.180 
 “Law enforcement officers . . . not only observed the autopsies, 
a fact that would have signaled to the medical examiner that 
the autopsy might bear on a criminal investigation, they 
participated in the creation of reports,” i.e., they were “present” 
at several examinations and they supplemented one report with 
a “crime diagram” and wrote in another: “Should have 
indictment re: John Raynor for this murder.”181 
 In United States v. Ignasiak, a doctor was convicted for 
overprescribing deadly pain medications.
182
 Prosecutors introduced seven 
autopsy reports, two of which their expert Dr. Minyard had performed 
                                                                                                                                                
reports in this case are nevertheless not testimonial”); Moore, 651 F.3d at 72 n.16 
(concluding it was “unnecessary to decide as a categorical matter whether autopsy reports 
are testimonial, and, in any event, it is doubtful that such an approach would comport 
with Supreme Court precedent”); Ignasiak, 667 F.3d at 1232-33 (leaving open possibility 
that if evidence had a non-testimonial ‘primary’ purpose it could avoid confrontation 
problem); but see Kennedy, 735 S.E.2d at 917 (determining that because examiner was 
obligated to contribute to judicial proceedings under West Virginia statute, “autopsy 
reports are under all circumstances testimonial”); Navarette, 294 P.3d at 441 (finding that 
“autopsy reports regarding individuals who suffered a violent death are testimonial.”). 
177
 United States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
178
 Id. at 72 n.15. 
179
 Id. at 72 (citations, quotations, and ellipsis omitted). 
180
 Id. at 73. 
181
 Id. 
182
 Ignasiak, 667 F.3d at 1219. 
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herself, as business records (not through her capacity as an expert).
183
 The 
Eleventh Circuit found the reports testimonial. They were prepared “for 
use at trial” under a “statutory framework” in which “medical examiners 
worked closely with law enforcement”:184 
 “Under Florida law, the Medical Examiners Commission was 
created and exists within the Department of Law Enforcement. 
Fla. Stat. § 406.02.”185 
 The Commission “must include one member who is a state 
attorney, one member who is a public defender, one member 
who is sheriff, and one member who is the attorney general or 
his designee, in addition to five other non-criminal justice 
members.”186 
 The examiner “relied upon information collected by ‘deputies 
on the scene.’”187 
 In United States v. James, conviction in a creepy conspiracy to 
murder for insurance cash turned on toxicology reports and autopsies that 
showed whether the deaths were accidental or caused by malicious 
poisoning.
188
 The Second Circuit found the reports non-testimonial: the 
“circumstances under which the analysis was prepared” didn’t “establish 
that the primary purpose of a reasonable analyst in the declarant’s position 
would have been to create a record for use at a later criminal trial.”189 The 
                                                          
183
 Id. at 1229 n.14. 
184
 Id. at 1232. 
185
 Id. at 1231-32. 
186
 Id. 
187
 Id. at 1232 n.17. 
188
 James, 712 F.3d at 85. 
189
 Id. at 94, 96,102. The court did not believe it was entitled to rely on the Williams 
plurality’s statement of the test since five Justices disagreed with it and it seemed to 
“conflict directly with Melendez–Diaz.” Id. at 95. 
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“key,” said the court, was the “particular relationship between [the 
medical examiner’s office] and law enforcement”:190 
 “[N]either the government nor defense counsel elicited any 
information suggesting that law enforcement was ever notified 
that Somaipersaud’s death was suspicious, or that any medical 
examiner expected a criminal investigation to result from it.”191 
 “There is no indication in Brijmohan’s testimony or elsewhere 
in the record that a criminal investigation was contemplated 
during the inquiry into the cause of Sewnanan’s death,” 
especially since the facts at the time suggested “accidental 
ingestion or suicide.”14  
 In State v. Kennedy,
192
 an autopsy report showed that the victim’s 
head had been bashed in. Prosecutors actually conceded that the report 
was testimonial,
193
 but the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals 
nonetheless proceeded to apply the “primary purpose” test to find 
testimoniality:
194
 
 “[M]ost compellingly, the autopsy and required report’s use in 
judicial proceedings is one of its statutorily defined 
                                                          
190
 James, 712 F.3d at 97. But Judge Eaton, concurring, noted that OCME had a 
“long history of cooperation with law enforcement” and “all autopsy reports would 
remain statements made directly to law enforcement insofar as they are statutorily 
required to be available to law enforcement officers and prosecutors.” Id. at 110, citing 
N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 17–205 (1998). 
191
 James, 712 F.3d at 99. It distinguished Ignasiak on this ground: “the Florida 
Medical Examiner’s Office was created and exists within the Department of Law 
Enforcement,” where the “OCME is a wholly independent office.” James, 712 F.3d at 99 
(citations omitted). See also United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 237 (2d Cir. 2006), a 
pre-Melendez-Diaz case, citing People v. Washington, 654 N.E.2d 967, 969 (N.Y. 1995), 
which noted that N.Y.C.’s medical examiners “are, by law, independent of and not 
subject to the control of the office of the prosecutor, and that OCME is not a law 
enforcement agency.” 
192
 State v. Kennedy, 735 S.E.2d 905 (W.Va. 2012). 
193
 Id. at 905, 912. 
194
 Id. at 916. 
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purposes.”195 The examiner is obligated to assist in the 
“formulation of conclusions, opinions or testimony in judicial 
proceedings.”196 
 “Kennedy was under suspicion and in fact, in custody, when 
the autopsy was conducted and therefore the autopsy report 
could arguably be said to have been prepared to ‘accuse a 
targeted individual.’”197 In a subsequent footnote “arguably” 
became “necessarily”: “Kennedy was arrested the day Viars’ 
body was discovered; therefore, the autopsy report necessarily 
became part of the case being assembled against him.”198 
 “Dr. Sabet testified that law enforcement officers [were] 
present during the autopsy, providing a ‘detailed history’ and 
engaging in a dialogue with the medical examiner about cause 
of death,” which “suggests a collaborative investigative effort 
in making the case against a suspect.”199  
 In People v. Leach, a husband strangled his wife to death.
 200
 Could 
the pressure on her neck have been an accident in a heated argument?
201
 
The Illinois Supreme Court found the autopsy report non-testimonial: it 
was neither “prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted 
individual” nor “for the primary purpose of providing evidence in a 
criminal case.”202 
                                                          
195
 Id. 
196
 Id. at 917, citing W. Va. Code § 61–12–3(d). 
197
 Kennedy, 735 S.E.2d at 917. 
198
 Id., at 917 n.10. 
199
 Id. 
200
 People v. Leach, 980 N.E.2d 570, 572 (Ill. 2012). 
201
 Id. at 595 (highlighting defendant’s suggestion that “some undiagnosed heart or 
other ailment” may have caused victim to die “more quickly than a healthy individual 
would have died from strangulation.”). 
202
 Id. at 590. 
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 “[A]lthough the police discovered the body and arranged for 
transport, there is no evidence that the autopsy was done at the 
specific request of the police. The medical examiner’s office 
performed the autopsy pursuant to state law, just as it would 
have if the police had arranged to transport the body of an 
accident victim.”203 
 “Although [Dr. Choi] was aware that the victim's husband was 
in custody and that he had admitted to ‘choking’ her, his 
examination could have either incriminated or exonerated him, 
depending on what the body revealed about the cause of death . 
. . . Dr. Choi was not acting as an agent of law enforcement, 
but as one charged with protecting the public health by 
determining the cause of a sudden death that might have been 
‘suicidal, homicidal or accidental.’”204 
 “Unlike a DNA test which might identify a defendant as the 
perpetrator of a particular crime, the autopsy finding of 
homicide did not directly accuse defendant. Only when the 
autopsy findings are viewed in light of defendant’s own 
statement to the police is he linked to the crime. In short, the 
autopsy sought to determine how the victim died, not who was 
responsible, and, thus, Dr. Choi was not defendant’s 
accuser.”205 
 In People v. Dungo, Dungo admitted to choking his girlfriend after 
a fight.
206
 The California Supreme Court held that the expert’s testimony 
about the autopsy report did not require confrontation of the report’s 
author.
207
  
                                                          
203
 Id. at 591. 
204
 Id. at 591-92 (citations omitted). 
205
 Id. at 592. 
206
 People v. Dungo, 286 P.3d 442, 446 (Cal. 2012). 
207
 Id. at 450. 
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 “Criminal investigation…[is] only one of several purposes” for 
autopsies: “the decedent’s relatives may use an autopsy report 
in determining whether to file an action for wrongful death. 
And an insurance company may use an autopsy report in 
determining whether a particular death is covered by one of its 
policies . . . . Also, in certain cases an autopsy report may 
satisfy the public’s interest in knowing the cause of death, 
particularly when (as here) the death was reported in the local 
media. In addition, an autopsy report may provide answers to 
grieving family members.”208 
 “The presence of a detective at the autopsy and the fact that the 
detective told the pathologist about defendant’s confession” did 
not make the report testimonial because the report itself was 
“simply an official explanation of an unusual death.”209 
  Finally, in Navarette, a man was shot from a car.
210
 At issue was 
whether the shooter was the car’s driver or passenger Navarette.211 Dr. 
Zumwalt, New Mexico’s Chief Medical Examiner, testified using a 
colleague’s report that the bullet wound and its lack of soot were 
consistent with Navarette’s position in the car.212 This was testimonial, 
said the New Mexico’s Supreme Court: 
 Dr. Zumwalt “conceded that it was immediately clear that this 
autopsy was part of a homicide investigation” and said two 
police officers had attended the autopsy.
213
 
Examiners were under a statutory duty to report about individuals who 
“die suddenly and unexpectedly,” so there was “no reason” an examiner 
should not “anticipate[][ that criminal litigation would result.”214   
                                                          
208
 Id. 
209
 Dungo, 286 P.3d at 450. 
210
 State v. Navarette, 294 P.3d 435, 436 (N.M. 2013). 
211
 Id. at 436. 
212
 Id. at 437. 
213
 Id. at 44-41. 
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The court concluded that the pathologist’s findings “went to the issues 
of whether Reynaldo’s death was a homicide and, if so, who shot him. 
These issues reflected directly on Navarette’s guilt or innocence.”215 This 
was declared a bright-line rule: murder autopsies are always testimonial.
216
 
 But if an examiner has a decedent and nothing more, how could 
her findings possibly reflect directly on Navarette’s guilt or innocence? 
How would the pathologist know who Navarette even was? A drowning 
could be a crime or a poolside tragedy; a heart attack could be caused by 
obesity or arsenic. It is only when a cause-of-death finding is linked to 
evidence extraneous to the report that a conviction happens. A body alone 
is never enough. 
 Melendez–Diaz noted that the drug analyst’s job existed “under 
Massachusetts law.”217 Courts have followed suit in examining the terms 
of autopsy-authorizing statutes, which vary considerably.
218
 California, for 
instance, has three different models among its counties, and a statute 
providing that a pathologist’s “[i]nquiry . . . does not include those 
investigative functions usually performed by other law enforcement 
agencies.”219 In Kansas, a pathologist can obtain “law enforcement 
background information” or perform an “examination of the scene of the 
cause of death.”220 Statutory provisions are just one element in the totality 
inquiry and probably lack the significance courts ascribe to them. A 
separate examiner’s office could be muscled by a sheriff, while an 
                                                                                                                                                
214
 Id. at 441. 
215
 Id.  
216
 Id. (holding that “autopsy reports regarding individuals who suffered a violent 
death are testimonial.”). 
217
 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311. 
218
 For a summary of the variety of systems, see NAS Report, supra note 114, at 243-
50. 
219
 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 27491 (West 2012). 
220
 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-231 (West 2000). 
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examiner with a lab in a police basement could still maintain perfect 
neutral integrity. Statutes say little about what actually happens, such as 
the extent to which a pathologist confers with police or family members to 
get the facts before an exam. A neutral-sounding name, like “State 
Laboratory Institute, a division of the Massachusetts Department of Public 
Health” (Melendez-Diaz) or “New Mexico Department of Health, 
Scientific Laboratory Division” (Bullcoming), won’t prevent a finding of 
testimoniality. Conversely, the fact that the medical examiner is 
administratively connected to the police should not automatically render 
all of its autopsy reports testimonial—no matter how far they are removed 
from police manipulation in practice. Such a rule would put form over 
substance. 
  Melendez-Diaz observed that the “majority of [labs producing 
forensic evidence] are administered by law enforcement agencies.”221 Not 
so with pathologist operations: 43% of Americans are served by 
independent coroner or examiner offices and another 14% by offices 
within health departments.
222
 Some medical examiners are even part of a 
university’s school of medicine.223  Most autopsies occur in mortuaries or 
hospital pathology wings. 
 A third of doctors work within law-enforcement bailiwicks, but not 
because their work is primarily related to law enforcement—it isn’t—but 
for administrative reasons.
224
 Many rural or suburban counties simply 
                                                          
221
 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 318 (“[W]hat respondent calls ‘neutral scientific 
testing’ is as neutral or as reliable as respondent suggests. . . . A forensic analyst 
responding to a request from a law enforcement official may feel pressure—or have an 
incentive—to alter the evidence in a manner favorable to the prosecution.”). For instance, 
the Sonoma County, California,  Sheriff’s Office website describes its Coroner Unit’s 
mission as “to provide competent and timely law enforcement and scientific 
investigations of all deaths [under statutory criteria].” Law Enforcement Division, 
SONOMA COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, 
http://www.sonomasheriff.org/about_law_enforcement.php (last visited Nov. 2, 2013). 
222
 NAS Report, supra note 114, at 249. 
223
 New Mexico v. Navarette, U.S. Supreme Court, Cert. Pet., No. 12-1256, 17-18.  
224
 NAS Report, supra note 114, at 249. 
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can’t afford to separately fund or house examiners and law enforcement. 
Mortuaries are costly; insurers don’t cover autopsies. Marin County saved 
$500,000 a year by merging its coroner and sheriff’s offices.225 In real 
cost-benefit terms, such a structure probably outweighs confrontation 
problems, especially in peaceful places where homicide is rare. The fact is 
that when corpses are involved, both law enforcement and examiners must 
be too. Federal judges might observe that for similar administrative 
reasons their courthouses also host U.S. attorneys, ATF agents, or federal 
marshals without compromising the judiciary’s integrity. In any event, 
structure is only one factor in a broad-ranging totality inquiry. The 
Crawford question is whether any particular statement is primarily 
motivated for use in a criminal trial; Bryant shows that even statements 
made to law enforcement officers investigating a crime can be non-
testimonial. It cannot be that a mere administrative structure tying medical 
examiners to law enforcement would make every examiner’s report 
testimonial. 
 We hesitate to suggest that examiners should have no contact with 
law enforcement. Pathologists want all available information. Everything 
helps. This can mean acquiring police reports—or the reports of 
paramedics or firemen, or medical histories and hospital records. 
Sometimes it means a pre-autopsy conference with police or a talk with 
the victim’s family. New York’s Dr. Helpern—who estimated that he 
performed some 20,000 autopsies and supervised 60,000 more over 45 
years
226—wrote that in cracking the famous Coppolino murders a 
witness’s tip that a victim had been injected with succinylcholine, a nearly 
undetectable muscle relaxant, was essential. “Had I been doing this 
autopsy without knowing the history of the case,” he wrote, he might have 
                                                          
225
 Nels Johnson, Marin’s Sheriff-Coroner Consolidation Saves $41,000 a Month, 
MARIN INDEPENDENT JOURNAL (May 5, 2013), available at 
http://www.marinij.com/ci_23166940/marins-sheriff-coroner-consolidation-saves-41-
000-month (noting that merger of county coroner into sheriff’s department saves country 
a half-million annually and that Marin was 48th county in California county to do so). 
226
 HELPERN, supra note 79, at 39. 
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missed the “tiny pink spot” on the left buttock that marked the needle’s 
point of entry.
227
 His resourceful toxicologist then proceeded to invent a 
method to trace the substance in the victim’s organs.228 Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence cannot be so hyper-technical as to impose a rule that 
might make medical examiners’ reports thorough and reliable. 
 In another case, Dr. Helpern explained why believed Ms. Carolee 
Biddy, in her day a noted murder defendant, was wrongly convicted.
229
 
Her step-daughter had gotten into a powerful drain cleaner. The 
pathologist, unaware of this fact, gave the cause of death as asphyxia, 
which it was. But the jury saw it as Ms. Biddy’s doing, when Dr. Helpern, 
after studying photos of the girl’s epiglottis, was sure that her throat had 
swollen shut from the chemical. Bluntly put, a wall between examiner and 
the case’s known facts, besides being pointless in non-criminal cases, will 
allow murderers to escape and innocents to suffer. If there remains a 
concern about law-enforcement involvement, a solution is to require 
pathologists to keep a record of contact with police, so that defense 
counsel can later look for improper influence or misrepresentation. If 
impropriety is found, a judge can rule on the record that the report carries 
the danger of a testimonial statement. But one is more likely to find a 
pathologist influencing law enforcement—especially in invalidating a 
theory of the detectives or prosecutors—than the other way around.230 
 There may be other routine and unavoidable involvement by 
adversarial officials, such as in delivering the body, but this activity alone 
                                                          
227
 HELPERN, supra note 79, at 29, 168, 184, 205-06. 
228
 HELPERN, supra note 79, at 31. 
229
 HELPERN, supra note 79, at 79-83. 
230
 Interview with Lieutenant R. Bowers, Coroner’s Bureau Unit Commander, in 
Alameda Cnty., Cal. (August 7, 2013) (notes on file with author); Interview with Dr. 
Thomas Beaver, Chief Forensic Pathologist, in Alameda Cnty., Cal. (August 6, 2013) 
(asserting that “pathologists won’t listen to anyone without at least an M.D.”) (notes on 
file with author). 
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cannot make the autopsy report testimonial.
231
 Nor should a state law like 
that in Illinois, which requires an examiner in homicide cases to deliver 
specimens from the decedent to the State Police’s Division of Forensic 
Services, warrant a finding of testimoniality in all cases.
232
 A pathologist’s 
obligation to report a homicide finding to police or a district attorney,
233
 
or, conversely, be informed of suspected homicide by police,
234
 says 
precious little about testimoniality. So, too, with laws that allow a state 
attorney to request an autopsy.
235
 A pathologist’s sense that a decedent 
with six gunshot wounds will arouse suspicion cannot alone make her 
report testimonial. If a vague consciousness on the examiner’s part that a 
report could one day show up in criminal prosecution was enough, all 
examinations would be testimonial—and that test, of mere anticipation 
that a statement might conceivably be used at trial, has already been 
rejected by the Supreme Court in Bryant and Davis.
236
 
                                                          
231
 James, 712 F.3d at 102 n.13 (“police were unquestionably involved in the 
Guyanese autopsy process, including, for example, transporting forensic samples for 
testing. As five Justices in Williams made clear, however, the involvement of ‘adversarial 
officials’ in an investigation is not dispositive as to whether or not a statement is 
testimonial. In this case, it appears that was simply the routine procedure employed by 
the Guyanese medical examiner in investigating all unnatural deaths, and does not 
indicate that a criminal investigation was contemplated.”). 
232
 Leach, 980 N.E.2d at 591 (citing 55 ILCS 5/3–3013 (West 2010)). 
233
 See, e.g., Navarette, 294 P.3d at 440-41 (“A medical examiner obligated to report 
her findings to the district attorney should know that her statements may be used in future 
criminal litigation.”) (referencing N.M. Stat. Ann. § 24-11-8 (West 1973)). 
234
 James, 712 F.3d at 97-98 (“While the OCME is an independent agency, the police 
are required to notify it when someone has died ‘from criminal violence, by accident, by 
suicide, suddenly when in apparent health, when unattended by a physician, in a 
correctional facility or in any suspicious or unusual manner or where an application is 
made pursuant to law for a permit to cremate a body of a person.’”). 
235
 Ignasiak, 667 F.3d at 1231-32 (holding that a medical examiner is obligated to 
perform autopsies “as shall be requested by the state attorney,” among other 
circumstances). 
236
See also Leach, 980 N.E.2d at 593 (“[A]n autopsy report prepared in the normal 
course of business of a medical examiner’s office is not rendered testimonial merely 
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  To assure that autopsy report avoid the Confrontation Clause’s 
prohibition, statutes and protocols should provide that pathologists receive 
no guidance from police beyond the receipt of basic facts and no specifics 
about the identity of possible perpetrators. Examiners should have no 
responsibility for gathering evidence or discovering perpetrators. A report 
might properly reference a “subarachnoid hemorrhage,” as one did, but it 
should not have mentioned the beating at the parking lot.
237
 (If a reference 
to outside facts creeps in, redact it.) Pathologists should be cautious about 
visiting a murder scene—uncommon anyway once “medical investigators” 
assumed this role—an act that risks police-doctor contact. Reports should 
be non-accusatory and devoid of legal conclusions. As put by the National 
Association of Medical Examiners, the task is to produce a “neutral and 
objective medical assessment of the cause and manner of death.”238 The 
concern is accuracy guided by the best professional standards.
239
 
Following these standards helps an examiner’s report avoid being 
entramelled in Bryant’s “primary motive” test. 
 
                                                                                                                                                
because the assistant medical examiner performing the autopsy is aware that police 
suspect homicide and that a specific individual might be responsible.”). 
237
 Manocchio v. Moran, 919 F.2d 770, 772 (1st. Cir 1990). 
238
 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, supra note 122 at A1, 1. See 
also United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315, 332 (2d Cir. 1993) (A “medical examiner, 
although often called a forensic expert” should “bear[] more similarity to a treating 
physician than he does to one who is merely rendering an opinion for use in the trial of a 
case.”)  Or, as the California Supreme Court put it, “statements describing the 
pathologist’s anatomical and physiological observations,” by contrast to “conclusions as 
to the cause of the victim’s death” are “comparable to observations of objective fact in a 
report by a physician who, after examining a patient, diagnoses a particular injury or 
ailment and determines the appropriate treatment.” Dungo, 286 P.3d at 449 (citing 
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 312 n.2 (“medical reports created for treatment purposes . . . 
would not be testimonial under our decision today”) (emphasis added)). 
239
 Especially, perhaps, if the result requires a division of labor. Williams, 132 S. Ct. 
at  2244 (“When the work of a lab is divided up in such a way, it is likely that the sole 
purpose of each technician is simply to perform his or her task in accordance with 
accepted procedures.). 
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B. CERTIFY OR SEAL THE REPORT WITH AN OATH? 
 
 A report’s formality came up in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming—
the cases discussed the certified character of the lab reports
240—but in 
Williams whether the Cellmark data was formally presented seemed 
chiefly of interest to Justice Thomas. Eight Williams votes viewed 
Thomas’s single-factor “formality” test an overtechnical basis upon which 
to decide testimoniality—“label[ing],” according to Justice Kagan, that 
made “(maybe) a nickel’s worth of difference.”241 Justice Thomas would 
allow admission even of accusatory statements so long as they lack 
solemnity.
242
 In Melendez-Diaz, he felt the certificates indicating cocaine 
were “quite plainly affidavits,”243 as he did in Bullcoming with the lab’s 
“certificate of analyst.”244 Yet in Williams he found the lab statements 
“neither a sworn nor a certified declaration of fact.”245 
 If Justice Thomas’s test were accepted, a prosecutor might be able 
to admit autopsy reports that were signed but not formally certified. In 
California,
246
 four justices seemed to find it significant that although a 
pathologist “signed and dated his autopsy report, it was not sworn or 
                                                          
240
 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710 (“question presented is whether the Confrontation 
Clause permits the prosecution to introduce a forensic laboratory report containing a 
testimonial certification”). 
241
 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2276 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
242
 Id. at 2261 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
243
 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 329-30 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
244
 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710. 
245
 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2260 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
246
 Dungo, 286 P.3d at 450 (“the presence of a detective at the autopsy and the fact 
that the detective told the pathologist about defendant's confession do not make the 
statements of objective fact in the autopsy report into formal and solemn testimony; but 
those circumstances do support defendant’s argument that the primary purpose of the 
autopsy was the investigation of a crime. Similarly, the fact that the autopsy was 
mandated by a statute that required public findings and notification of law enforcement 
does not imply that the statements of objective fact in the report are formal and solemn 
testimony, but it does imply that the primary purpose of the autopsy was forensic.”). 
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certified in a manner comparable to the chemical analyses in Melendez–
Diaz and Bullcoming.”247 The Illinois Supreme Court (the other high court 
to find autopsy reports generally non-testimonial) noted that unlike the 
Melendez–Diaz certificates, the autopsy report it considered “was not 
certified or sworn in anticipation of its being used as evidence; it was 
merely signed by the doctor who performed [it].”248 Still, a factor rejected 
by eight justices as significant (let alone controlling) counsels caution in 
preparing unformalized autopsy reports in the expectation that they will 
thereby avoid confrontation problems. The best that can be hoped for by 
the government is that a lack of formality would support a finding of non-
testimoniality. This should be far less significant (and is in the case law) 
than the question of whether the medical examiner was influenced by law 
enforcement to make the autopsy report a document for litigation.  
 
C. EXPERT TESTIMONY 
 
 If an autopsy report is testimonial, can one doctor testify using the 
work of another? This practice is a real problem for defendants. In 
Ignasiak, for instance, “Dr. Minyard indicated she lacked enough 
information to agree or disagree with Dr. Kelly’s conclusion that patient 
S.P.’s death was a suicide”249 and “could not testify from direct 
knowledge about the condition of a particular patient’s heart, lungs or 
brain and, as a result, whether that patient may have actually died from a 
                                                          
247
 Dungo, 286 P.3d at 452. The court further noted that the autopsy report “contrasts 
in this respect with the coroner’s or attending physician’s “[c]ertification and signature” 
on a death certificate, by which the declarant “attest[s] to [the] accuracy” of “the portion 
of the certificate setting forth the cause of death (citing Health & Saf. Code, § 102875, 
subd. (a)(7)). . . . [T]he two documents, autopsy report and death certificate, are distinct, 
and only the latter bears a formal certification mandated by statute.” Id. at 452. 
248
 Leach, 980 N.E.2d at 592. See also Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 431 (“the autopsy 
report, which was unsworn, cannot fairly be viewed as ‘formalized testimonial 
material.’”). 
249
 Ignasiak, 667 F.3d at 1225. 
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heart attack, stroke, or some cause other than drug overdose.”250 A non-
autopsying expert will be able speak to procedure, highlighting an office’s 
diligence and expertise, but not about the one-off errors and oversights 
that are precisely what the defense seeks to uncover. 
 Justice-counting in Williams leads to the conclusion that 
unadmitted autopsy reports, if testimonial, cannot serve as the basis for the 
opinion of an expert who played no role in the autopsy,
251
 even if the 
testimony is the expert’s own independent conclusion and he can be cross-
examined about it.
252
 The New Mexico Supreme Court believes this was 
decided
253
 by Justices Thomas and Kagan in Williams, the latter rejecting 
                                                          
250
 Id. at 1234. 
251
 The viability of using Federal Rule of Evidence 703 or state analogues was still 
an open question after Bullcoming. See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring) (“We would face a different question if asked to determine the 
constitutionality of allowing an expert witness to discuss others’ testimonial statements if 
the testimonial statements were not themselves admitted as evidence.”); Moore, 651 F.3d 
at 72 (“Bullcoming . . . only considered a testifying lab technician who had ‘no 
involvement whatsoever in the relevant test and report.’”). Courts certainly approved of 
this route before Melendez-Diaz. Craig, 853 N.E.2d at 637 (determining that there was no 
unavailability requirement with expert autopsy testimony). 
252
 Kennedy, 735 S.E.2d at 921 (“[A]s to the opinions regarding the non-fatal stab 
wounds and tire markings, it is equally clear that these are original observations and 
opinions developed by Dr. Sabet himself. Dr. Sabet unequivocally testified that these 
were additional opinions he derived from inspection of the clothing and autopsy 
photographs; they are mentioned nowhere in the autopsy report itself”); United States v. 
Johnson, 587 F.3d 625, 635 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Crawford forbids the introduction of 
testimonial hearsay as evidence in itself, but it in no way prevents expert witnesses from 
offering their independent judgments merely because those judgments were in some part 
informed by their exposure to otherwise inadmissible evidence”); Lackey, 120 P.3d at 
352 (“Dr. Mitchell based his opinions and conclusions upon photographs, a toxicology 
report, and the death certificate which was prepared by the coroner who provided 
corroborating testimony at trial.”). 
253
 Navarette, 294 P.3d at 441 (“[T]he autopsy report was not admitted into evidence. 
Thus, the issue here is whether an expert can relate out-of-court statements to the jury 
that provide the basis for his or her opinion, as long as the written statements themselves 
are not introduced.”). 
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such testimony as a “neat trick.”254 Precedents already disallow 
“surrogate” testimony255 or testimony that is a “mere conduit” for 
inadmissible evidence.
256
 The logic, per Melendez-Diaz, is that 
confrontation lets a defendant test “honesty, proficiency, and 
methodology”257—even when examiners boast the “scientific acumen of 
Mme. Curie and the veracity of Mother Theresa.”258 Justices Alito, 
Kennedy, and Breyer, and Chief Justice Roberts disagree: expert 
statements made “solely for the purpose of explaining the assumptions on 
                                                          
254
 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2259 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2272 (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (“[U]nder the plurality’s approach, the prosecutor could choose the analyst-
witness of his dreams (as the judge here said, “the best DNA witness I have ever heard”), 
offer her as an expert (she knows nothing about the test, but boasts impressive degrees), 
and have her provide testimony identical to the best the actual tester might have given 
(“the DNA extracted from the vaginal swabs matched Sandy Williams’s”)—all so long as 
a state evidence rule says that the purpose of the testimony is to enable the factfinder to 
assess the expert opinion’s basis…. What a neat trick—but really, what a way to run a 
criminal justice system. No wonder five Justices reject it.”). 
255
 Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710. 
256
 Kennedy, 735 S.E.2d at 920-22, Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710; Ignasiak, 667 
F.3d at 1234. See also Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2276 (“[W]e do not think it conceivable that 
the protections of the Confrontation Clause can readily be evaded by having a note-taking 
policeman recite the unsworn hearsay testimony of the declarant, instead of having the 
declarant sign a deposition.”); United States v. Pablo, 625 F.3d 1285, 1292 (10th Cir. 
2010) (“If an expert simply parrots another individual’s testimonial hearsay, rather than 
conveying her independent judgment that only incidentally discloses testimonial hearsay . 
. . then the expert is, in effect, disclosing the testimonial hearsay for its substantive truth 
and she becomes little more than a backdoor conduit for otherwise inadmissible 
testimonial hearsay”); State v. Aragon, 225 P.3d 1280, 1290 (N.M. 2010) (“Young’s 
testimony was a restatement of Champagne’s conclusory opinion regarding the narcotic 
content of the substance, its weight, and its purity as stated in her hearsay report. . . . 
[Aragon] had a right to challenge the judgment and conclusions behind Champagne’s 
opinion.”). 
257
 Ignasiak, 667 F.3d at 1233 (citing Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 320). 
258
 Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 319 n.6.; Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2714 (holding that 
only testimony by person who actually prepared the forensic report has the insight needed 
to “expose any lapses or lies on [the certifying analyst’s] part.”).  
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which that opinion rests are not offered for their truth.”259 That’s only four 
votes. The better path is to admit autopsy reports directly, as non-
testimonial report under the “primary motive” test, after assuring that law-
enforcement involvement is not so pervasive as to prevent a finding that 
the report was prepared for purposes unrelated to use as evidence in a 
criminal trial. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION: THE PROPER TEST 
 
 There is no “autopsy” exception to the Confrontation Clause. We 
think, rather, that the vast majority of autopsy reports are just outside the 
clause’s scope—presumptively non-testimonial in light of a medical 
examiner’s actual work. Reliability can’t justify unconfronted admission; 
nor can neutrality, or the state’s need for the evidence, or the fact the 
autopsies cannot be recreated. What is enough are statistics showing that 
at least 90% of autopsy reports in fact do not have a primary purpose in 
furnishing evidence for a prosecution. The primary purpose, the 
predominating purpose, is public health. Even in the fraction of cases 
where a report is eventually used in a prosecution, that doesn’t mean the 
report was prepared for such a purpose. 
Courts should presume that autopsy reports are non-testimonial 
because they are written independently by neutral doctors concerned with 
accuracy, not police officers seeking conviction. The presumption isn’t 
overcome by the fact that the examiner and the police might be 
administratively conjoined. The proper test for the Confrontation Clause, 
fairly applied, is:  
Has been specific and pervasive involvement by law 
enforcement in the preparation of the autopsy report, such 
as to change the basic character of the document from one 
serving pathological purposes to one serving prosecutorial 
purposes?  
                                                          
259
 Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2228. 
2014] Autopsy Reports and the Confrontation Clause 115  
 
 
 
Only when that line is crossed does a medical examiner becomes a 
“witness” against the accused. Defense allegations that this happened 
should be litigated in light of a record of contacts kept by the medical 
examiner. 
Of course the state cannot generate evidence against the accused 
without the right of confrontation. The Founders removed that damnable 
weapon from the arsenal. But to demand confrontation of every autopsy 
report in a prosecution would be to misinterpret a noble principle and 
would very likely subvert justice before promoting it. This is an 
exceedingly unstable area of law. The proper application of the 
Confrontation Clause does not command a majority in the Supreme Court 
or consensus in the states. Which means there is still time to do the right 
thing. 
